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TRANSIT PROBLEMS OF THREE ASIAN LAND-LOCKED 
COUNTRIES: AFGHANISTAN, NEPAL AND LAOS 
Martin Ira Glassner* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There are at present some thirty land-locked states in the world, 
depending on whether one counts such entities as Andorra and Vati-
can City as "states." Of them, fourteen, or nearly half, are in Africa, 
five are in Asia, two in South America and the rest in Europe. All 
but those in Europe are poor and sixteen are tallied among the "least 
developed" countries in the world by United Nations reckoning. 
The sixteen represent not only half of all the land-locked countries, 
but more than half of the twenty-nine least developed. These pro-
portions are not coincidental. 
A location in the interior of a continent tends to isolate a coun-
try from the main world flows of goods, people and ideas. Interior 
countries lack the "window on the world" that a seaport provides. 
Once isolation was valued, for it provided some measure of security 
against a wide range of dangers from foreign invaders to hurricanes. 
Now, however, isolation is a clear disadvantage. 
Even if there were no political, strategic or social handicaps to 
being land-locked, the economic consequences would be serious 
enough. First of all, sheer distance from the sea, which still carries 
most of the world's international commerce, means high transport 
costs. Compounding the problem of distance is the nature of the 
terrain: most land-locked states are separated from the sea by high 
mountains, steep ravines or escarpments, dense forests or long 
stretches of sparsely-populated country that neither produce nor 
consume very much. 
Typically, partly because of topographic features, partly be-
cause of colonial transport policies and partly because of the poverty 
of most land-locked and transit states, the transport systems used by 
land-locked countries are inadequate in facilities, maintenance and 
management. Frequently there are serious imbalances in the direc-
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tion or seasonal flow of goods as well. Communications, essential to 
keep traffic flowing smoothly, often are inadequate or unreliable, 
making traffic management very difficult. Delays in transit, caused 
by these circumstances, not only increase direct costs such as insur-
ance, storage, interest on loans, penalties and other charges, but also 
increase the risk - and the actuality - of loss, theft, damage and 
deterioration. Merchants at either end of a trading relationship can 
lose a great deal of money when delays in transit mean goods arrive 
too late to be useful or saleable. Construction projects can be 
delayed and machinery and vehicles immobilized, all for want of 
materials, equipment or parts that are lost, damaged or delayed in 
transit. 
None of these problems is peculiar to land-locked countries; all 
are suffered by the interior districts of developing coastal states as 
well. What compounds these problems for the land-locked states is 
that between them and the sea is at least one international boundary, 
sometimes more. This means that the transit states can, and often 
do, impose complicated transit and customs formalities, excessive 
documentation and even, at times, higher charges for traffic in transit 
than for domestic traffic. Not only do goods in transit, therefore, 
have to endure cumbersome procedures and high costs at the ports, 
but also at the border, and this increases the time and cost of transit. 
These and other problems can be reduced, though never elimi-
nated entirely, if the land-locked state either has several alternate 
routes to the sea or is on excellent terms with its transit state or 
states. Happily, one or both of these conditions normally prevails in 
most land-locked States. There are, however, many examples of 
transit routes being deliberately blocked for varying periods and, de-
spite transit agreements, interferences with transit - deliberate or 
accidental - always lurk in the background as real possibilities. 
Clearly, political as well as economic factors are important in deter-
mining the true significance of land-lockedness in individual cases. 
In addition to political and economic factors, psychological fac-
tors may intensify the very real handicaps of having no seacoast. 
Seaports, the "windows on the world" mentioned previously, stimu-
late growth and change; their absence tends to promote isolationism 
and stagnation. Moreover, the educated elites, at least, of land-
locked states know they are cut off from the sea, perhaps by a hostile 
neighbor, and may experience feelings of deprivation, resentment, 
even claustrophobia. These feelings can and do have an impact on 
both internal development policies and foreign relations. 
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2. REDUCING THE HANDICAPS OF LAND-LOCKEDNESS 
The land-locked States of Europe no longer suffer these handi-
caps, partly because of more favorable political, economic and geo-
graphic factors, and partly because the problems have been slowly 
and sometimes painfully resolved during the past few centuries. 
Those in Africa, Asia and South America, however, must deal with 
them as they can. They are currently, it seems, simultaneously pur-
suing six overlapping and interrelated approaches: 
(a) Internationallaw 
(b) Bilateral negotiations 
(c) Internal development, especially transport 
(d) Improved transit facilities and alternate routes 
(e) Regional integration and cooperation 
(f) United Nations organs and specialized agencies 
A brief explanation of each of these might be helpful. 
(a) International Law 
Gradually in early modem Europe, insistence on absolute terri-
torial sovereignty, which had led to the imposition of tolls and re-
strictions on transit traffic, began to give way to a recognition of the 
advantages of a free flow of trade. During the nineteenth century 
principles of free transit became established to aid commerce and 
industry for the benefit of transit and land-locked states alike. 
The League of Nations sponsored a series of conferences during 
the 1920's which produced both bilateral and multilateral treaties 
aimed at the facilitation of free transit. Of these, the most important 
were the Barcelona Convention and Statute on Freedon of Transit of 
1921, and the Convention and Statute on the International Regime 
of Maritime Ports, signed at Geneva in 1923. Together they set min-
imum standards for the transit and other rights of all states, includ-
ing those lacking coasts. 
After World War II several important events and trends con-
joined to improve access to the sea for land-locked states. For one 
thing, a relatively new concept emerged, that access to the sea is es-
sential for the expansion of international trade and economic devel-
opment. The achievement of independence by many former 
colonies in Asia and Africa stimulated increasing emphasis on this 
relationship, rather than on the traditional stress on "rights" and 
"duties" of states. Among the leaders in this renewed battle for a 
"free and secure access to the sea" (to borrow Woodrow Wilson's 
phrase referring to Poland and Serbia) and Afghanistan and Bolivia. 
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The first noteworthy fruit of their efforts was Article 3 of the Con-
vention on the High Seas adopted by the first United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea in 1958. 
This represented progress, but was clearly not adequate, so pres-
sure increased for a more definitive solution to the problem. As a 
result, the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD) adopted eight principles on access to the sea and 
several recommendations, one of which led to the United Nations 
Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States, signed at New 
York in July 1965. This was the first multilateral treaty to deal spe-
cifically with the problem but, while it certainly gave a measure of 
"status" to it, it did not offer a solution. Its effectiveness is limited, 
moreover, by the fact that only a few transit states have ratified or 
acceded to it and only one of these (Nigeria) provides transit for a 
developing land-locked country. 
The battle was continued on a broader front in the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), 
1973-1982. Here the land-locked countries joined forces with some 
so-called geographically disadvantaged states to form a group of 54 
members within the Conference. They worked both for improved 
transit provisions in the evolving Convention on the Law of the Sea 
and for assurance of access to and benefits from the resources of the 
sea. They certainly did not make gains at UNCLOS III proportion-
ate either to their needs or their efforts, but at least the transit provi-
sions (Part X) of the Convention represent a slight net gain over the 
1965 New York Convention. 
International law, as it has developed so far, can provide a 
framework or background for the development of more specific rules 
and norms by land-locked and transit states and it can serve as a 
datum plane, a standard against which actual state practice in transit 
matters can be measured. It has not yet, however, assured land-
locked countries of a guaranteed right of transit and is not likely to 
do so in the foreseeable future. 
(b) Bilateral Negotiations 
All multilateral conventions dealing with this subject insist that 
the "terms and modalities" (or similar phrasing) of transit arrange-
ments must be negotiated bilaterally (or regionally) by the land-
locked and transit countries. In these negotiations, the coastal state 
in most cases is larger, richer and more powerful than the interior 
state, and it is often difficult for the latter to win what it considers 
satisfactory transit arrangements. The coastal state, moreover, fre-
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quently insists on including transit as just one more item in a trade 
treaty or in an even broader treaty of friendship. Such treaties are 
usually short-term, generally expiring after ten years, sometimes 
after five. Transit thus does not get the careful attention it deserves 
and can be restricted or even withdrawn upon the expiration of the 
agreement. 
The land-locked state, then, finds that in order to obtain and 
retain the transit necessary for its economic development, it must 
remain on good terms with a transit state, regardless of political, so-
cial, cultural, military, economic or other disparities between them. 
Or it must have something of very great value to offer in exchange 
for adequate and assured transit, or it must bargain with consum-
mate skill. These are very great burdens to place on a country which 
is very likely small, poor and weak. Nevertheless, because transit 
states do have something to gain from a relatively free flow of com-
merce, and because they are generally interested in maintaining 
world public order, transit trade ofland-locked countries does move, 
however imperfectly, across the sovereign territory of coastal states 
under terms of bilateral agreements. But in nearly all cases these 
agreements can be greatly improved. 
(c) Internal Development, Especially Transport 
In all developing countries improvement of transport infrastruc-
ture and equipment has high priority. For the developing land-
locked countries, in general, transport is essential for all the usual 
reasons and, in addition, for its value in reducing their isolation from 
the rest of the world. There is, furthermore, little to be gained from 
even ideal transit arrangements with coastal states if goods cannot 
move quickly and safely to and from the border within the interior 
state. 
In addition to the basic road, rail and water transport facilities, 
the developing land-locked countries are working to improve cargo-
handling and storage facilities, telecommunications, and the organi-
zation and administration of internal freight movement. Even where 
international trade is essential for basic economic health, procedures 
for clearing and forwarding may be antiquated and inhibiting and 
are being improved in many places. Air transport is important in 
most developing countries, including those without littorals, but 
rarely carries a high proportion of the freight moving either inter-
nally or in foreign commerce. 
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(d) Improved Transit Facilities and Alternate Routes 
With the exceptions of the USSR and South Africa, all coun-
tries which provide transit for developing land-locked states are 
themselves poor and some, indeed, rank among the least developed. 
Their transport systems are often overburdened with their own traf-
fic and transit traffic is an unwelcome additional burden. Seaports 
are congested, procedures impede rather than expedite movement, 
and traffic is interrupted by strikes and civil disturbances as well as 
by uncontrollable natural forces. 
Land-locked countries are trying to resolve these problems by a 
variety of methods. In some cases, particularly as in parts of Africa 
where transit traffic provides a large share of the revenues of the 
transport systems of coastal states, they actually participate in the 
ownership and/or operation of the transport facilities. Elsewhere, 
they contribute to the improvement of these facilities, maintaining 
free zones in ports and transshipment points and, perhaps more im-
portant, trying to develop alternate transit routes, both within a sin-
gle transit state and through several coastal counties. 
Dependence on a single seaport and/or a single transport line 
renders a land-locked state vulnerable to interruption of transit, 
while alternate routes and ports spread both the risks and benefits 
while stimulating development in difference parts of both the land-
locked and transit countries. Economic benefits and costs, however, 
vary greatly from place to place and even from time to time and 
must be carefully calculated. 
(e) Regional Integration and Cooperation 
Indisputably, the only way to eliminate completely the transit 
problems of land-locked states is to eliminate all international 
boundaries between them and the sea; that is, political integration 
with coastal states. This has not happened in recent times, however, 
and is unlikely to happen anywhere very soon. The next best way to 
resolve transit problems is through regional economic integration. 
This has been accomplished in varying degrees in East, West and 
South-Central Africa, and in South America. The best example of 
economic integration facilitating transit for a land-locked country 
was the East African Community until its demise in the mid-1970s. 
Even in this case, however, Uganda and non-member Rwanda ex-
perienced interruption of their transit traffic. 
Various kinds and levels of economic cooperation not involving 
integration have also resulted in better transit for land-locked coun-
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tries. The Asian Highway and the Latin American Railroad Associ-
ation are examples of such cooperation. Some observers are 
postulating now that regionalism is, in fact, the most feasible and 
even the most desirable approach not only to transit problems but 
also to the use of the sea and exploitation of its resources by land-
locked countries. That remains to be seen, but the benefits of re-
gional cooperation in transit matters, even without integration, are 
already quite apparent, particularly in West Africa. 
(f) United National Organs and Specialized Agencies 
For more than a quarter of a century the United Nations has 
been increasingly active in taking and encouraging "special meas-
ures related to the particular needs of the land-locked developing 
countries," as the UN phrases it. UNCTAD has produced a number 
of valuable studies and recommendations concerning both transit fa-
cilities and procedures, and has provided technical assistance to a 
number of countries. It has a unit specializing in landlocked and 
certain other developing countries. The United Nations Develop-
ment Programme has a special project to provide "Assistance to the 
Least Developed Land-locked Countries." It began operating in 
South Asia in 1975 and has more recently been extended to East, 
West and Southern Africa. The World Bank and the regional devel-
opment banks have invested heavily in transport infrastructure. 
The regional economic commissions have been especially active 
in different ways in helping the land-locked countries in their re-
gions. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), for example, sponsors an intergovern-
mental Special Body on Land-locked Countries, organized in 1972; 
the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) has sponsored nu-
merous meetings of transit and customs experts to recommend im-
provements in these areas; and UN Economic Commission for Latin 
America (CEPAL) has developed an Integrated Transit System for 
Bolivian goods in transit through the Chilean ports of Africa and 
Antofagasta. 
In December 1976 the General Assembly established the United 
Nations Special Fund for Land-locked Developing Countries. It 
acts as an organ of the GA in collecting and disbursing voluntary 
contributions "in order to compensate the land-locked countries for 
their additional transport costs." To date the fund has been very 
small, but it has been able to finance the acquisition or construction 
of key bottleneck-breaking facilities and equipment for several coun-
tries in Africa and Asia. Finally, assistance to developing land-
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locked countries is perenially on the agenda of the General Assem-
bly; undoubtedly new initiatives to relieve their plight will be forth-
coming in years to come. 
Despite all of this activity by and on behalf of the World's land-
locked countries, the fact remains that most of them remain small, 
poor and weak. The following case studies of Afghanistan, Nepal 
and Laos illustrate the complexities of their problems. They were 
chosen because of the five land-locked countries in Asia, they are the 
three with the greatest volume of transit trade (i.e., trade with coun-
tries other than their immediate neighbors), they are the only ones 
which participate actively in regional and sub-regional transport and 
related projects, and they are the ones for which most information is 
available. Mongolia and Bhutan are not only utterly rependent 
upon the Soviet Union and India respectively for transit, but are also 
economic and to a large extent political dependencies of their transit 
states. Thus they tend to be atypical and both Asian states and land-
locked states. 1 
3. AFGHANISTAN2 
Afghanistan is a mountain country, straddling the mighty 
Hindu Kush, a range rising to more than 24,000 feet radiating west-
ward for more than 700 miles from the great Pamir Knot of Central 
Asia. To the north and south of the Hindu Kush are lower parallel 
ranges and still further to the north and south, lowlands. Even 
within the lowlands, however, are other mountain ranges rising to 
I. Much of the material in these case studies is drawn from the author's experience 
as advisor to His Majesty's Government of Nepal on negotiations with India for a new 
transit treaty in 1976 and as consultant to the United Nations Development Programme 
on Project RAS/72/077, which involved visiting Afghanistan, Nepal and Laos in 1979 
and recommending improvements in this project to aid the least-developed land-locked 
countries of Asia. Much additional material is drawn from United Nations reports. 
These are the principal sources of unattributed statistics and statements in the text 
which follows. In addition to these sources and those cited in these notes, many more 
may be useful to persons seeking additional information on the subject. The most com-
plete guide extant is Martin Ira Glassner, Bibliography on Land-locked States, Alphen 
aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1980. 
2. The present tense, as used in these three case studies, must be understood to 
mean the period 1978-1982 without taking into account major events, such as the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979, which may have altered the situation. 
Generally speaking, less information is available for all three countries for more recent 
years than for the early part of this period. For a detailed case study of Afghanistan's 
transit problems, see Martin Ira Glassner, Access to the Sea for /)eve/oping Land-locked 
States, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970. Much of the older material in this section 
comes from this study. 
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15,000 feet, bringing the mountainous area of the country to more 
than two-thirds of the total. While the plains and mountain valleys 
contain most of the economic activity of the country, the mountains 
dominate its history, geography and psychology. 
The country is drained by many rivers and smaller streams, but 
only four are considered major ones. The most important, and the 
only one that is navigable, is the Amu Darya, known historically as 
the Oxus. This river rises high in the Pamirs, flows westward 
through northeastern Afghanistan and along the Soviet border, then 
northward through the Kara Kum Desert, eventually to empty into 
the Aral Sea. Below Bakhorak the Amu Darya is broad and mean-
dering with many islands. The left, or Afghan, bank is low and sub-
ject to flooding; the right, or Soviet, bank is firmer and all of the 
sizable river towns are on the Soviet side. 
The climate of Afghanistan may be described as generally dry 
but variable, since elevation and exposure, as well as the seasons, 
produce a wide variety of climates. The north is generally colder 
and drier than the south, the border area being, except in the eastern 
mountains, a true desert. In the south, from Kandahar westward 
well into Iran, is the Registan Desert, where temperatures sometimes 
go well over 100°F. For the most part, however, the country is 
cooler and, of course, quite cold in the mountains, Kabul, the capi-
utal, is in the better-watered eastern portion of the country, but be-
cause of its altitude (about 6,000 feet) still receives only 13.3 inches 
of precipitation per year. 
Despite some rudimentary industrialization and some mining, 
mostly of coal, iron ore and natural gas, Afghanistan is still an agri-
cultural country. Some three-quarters of the national income is de-
rived from agriculture and only after usually poor harvests is it 
necessary to import food. The principal crops are wheat, cotton, 
sugar beets and cane, fruits and nuts. Livestock are also important, 
with chickens, camels and cattle raised in much of the country. By 
far the most important livestock, however, are the Karakul sheep, 
which produce both wool and from one to three million skins ("Per-
sian lamb") a year for export. 
Foreign trade has been growing in importance, particularly 
since 1954, when economic development programs began. Karakul 
has long been the most important export, but exports of fruits and 
nuts - fresh, dried and preserved - have geen growing rapidly. 
Cotton, carpets and rugs, oil seeds, wool, hides and skins and sau-
sage casings are all important traditional exports. Recently, the So-
viet Union has been importing significant and growing quantities of 
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natural gas from Afghanistan and is expected to develop the rich 
Haji-gak iron ore deposits in the eastern mountains for her own sup-
plies. Afghanistan's best customers, in order, are the Soviet Union, 
the United Kingdom, the United States, Pakistan, India, West Ger-
many and Japan. 
Imports, as might be expected, consist of a wide variety of capi-
tal and consumer goods and petroleum products, by far the most 
important import.. The USSR supplies nearly all of Afghanistan's 
petroleum and sugar imports, while other important suppliers are 
India, Pakistan, Japan, West Germany. Czechoslovakia and the 
United States. To the commercial imports, however, must be added 
the inflow of aid goods. 
(a) Afghan Transit Routes and Facilities 
Afghanistan for millenia has been a crossroads of history, with 
traders, migrants and soldiers passing through in every direction -
and often settling down to form part of the variegated population. 
The ancient Silk Road and Spice Road crossed the country and have 
recently been revived with modern technology. Not until the parti-
tion oflndia in 1947, however, had there been any problems with the 
flow of goods from, to and through the country. 
Before the partition of India, relations between the two coun-
tries were governed by the Treaty for the Establishment of Neigh-
borly Relations between the Government of Afghanistan and the 
British Government, dated 22 November 1921, and the Anglo-Af-
ghan Trade Convention of June 1923. Neither dealt exclusively with 
transit, but both emphasized the principle of freedom of transit ex-
pressed in the Convention and Statute on Freedom of Transit, 
adopted at a League of Nations conference in Barcelona in 1921. 
The first treaty exempted most Afghan goods entering Indian ports 
from customs duties and specified customs clearance procedures. 
Routes between the ports and Afghanistan were also agreed upon, as 
well as procedures for inspection and sealing of goods in transit. 
The second treaty specified the transit routes and administrative pro-
cedures in more detail. 
When partition was proposed, Afghanistan took the opportunity 
to suggest a separate sovereign state for the Pathans (closely related 
to the Pushtus of Afghanistan) of the Northwest Frontier Province. 
This idea was rejected by the Muslims of India and, after indepen-
dence, by Pakistan as well. Afghanistan, however, continued to 
press for an independent Pushtunistan. Pakistan, in retaliation, be-
gan delaying Afghan transit traffic in various ways. Some goods 
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were damaged enroute to Afghanistan; some never arrived at all. 
The situation deteriorated as the Kashmir dispute intensified and by 
December 1949 Afghan transit traffic through Karachi had virtually 
halted. 
In reaction to this and other frustrations, the Afghans in July 
1950 signed a four-year barter agreement, the first in its history, with 
the Soviet Union. It provided also for Soviet technical assistance to 
Afghanistan and free transit for Afghan goods through the USSR. 
Trade with the Soviet Union mushroomed from 1950 to 1955, while 
Afghan transit trade through Karachi also increased. By 1955 80 
percent of Afghanistan's exports and 79 percent of her imports 
passed through Pakistan. In 1955, however, there were more riots 
over Pushtunistan and Pakistan again closed the border, this time for 
five months. 
The Afghans reacted by beginning a search for a transit route 
through Iran and by asking the Soviets for a renewal of the 1950 
transit agreement. The renewal, dated 28 June 1955, also provided 
for Soviet transit through Afghanistan and a massive increase in So-
viet aid to the country. 
Relations with Pakistan also improved (under American pres-
sure) and on May 29, 1958 Pakistan and Afghanistan signed a transit 
agreement which provided for improved facilities for Afghan goods. 
This new display of good will, however, did not endure, for in Au-
gust 1961 another dispute broke out between the two neighbors 
which again resulted in their common border being closed, this time 
until July 1963. During this period the Afghans signed a new agree-
ment with the Soviets increasing Afghan transit facilities in the 
USSR (November 1961), and a first agreement with Iran granting 
Afghanistan some transit facilities in that country (January 1962). 
While the latter agreement does not appear to have been imple-
mented, the former resulted in the diversion of all Afghan overland 
trade (except for U.S. aid goods) through the USSR. 
Finally, on May 28, 1963, Afghanistan and Pakistan signed an 
agreement in Tehran re-establishing diplomatic relations and re-
opening the border. Trade and transit were to be resumed under 
terms of the 1958 agreement. Thereafter, relations with Pakistan im-
proved while Afghanistan's economic development accelerated. The 
bulk of Afghan transit traffic had shifted, however, probably perma-
nently, to the Soviet routes. In 1975, 70 percent went this way, while 
only about 20 percent passed through Pakistan, and in that year Af-
ghanistan and the Soviet Union signed another transit agreement. 
While the Pushtunistan issue involves primarily Afghanistan 
12 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
and Pakistan, Iran is concerned with it also, especially when, as after 
the overthrow of Afghan monarchy in July 1973, the Afghan propo-
sal includes part of Baluchistan as well. In order to calm the tension 
between them, Iran and Afghanistan sent official delegations to one 
another in 1974. They reached agreements on Iranian aid to Af-
ghanistan, extension of the Iranian railroad network to Herat, Kan-
dahar and Kabul and, in September 1974, a new five-year transit 
agreement. There were also discussions, as there had been in years 
past, of new road and rail routes between Afghanistan and Iranian 
ports, specifically Bandar Abbas and Chah Bahar, but none of these 
proposed facilities has yet been constructed. 3 
Afghan transit traffic does, however, flow through Iran. In 1978 
the Afghan government, in a joint venture with a Dutch firm, cre-
ated the Afghan International Transport Company (AITC) to oper-
ate trucks between Afghanistan and Europe. The company owns ten 
DAF tractor-trailers. They are generally used between Europe and 
Afghanistan, but some trips are made to Pakistan and some from 
point to point within Europe. They carry mostly carpets, rugs, hand-
icrafts, antiques, dried fruits, seeds and other high-value goods to 
Europe and bring back machinery, equipment, spare parts, tires and 
tubes, electrical appliances and household goods, vehicles and tex-
tiles. The average trip from Kabul to Frankfurt or Milan takes 19 
days, to Basle 19 days, to Rotterdam 20, and to London 21. These 
trips are made under a variety of bilateral agreements and under the 
1959 Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods 
under Cover of TIR Carnets, but are handicapped by limitations on 
various insurance and customs payment systems.4 
The chaotic situation in Iran since 1979, including revolution 
and the war with Iraq, has restricted Afghan transit somewhat and 
increased costs considerably, especially in extortions all along the 
route (a problem even more serious in Turkey). The same is true for 
the incipient Afghan overland trade with the Arab countries along 
the Persian Gulf. 5 
3. For details on Afghan-Iranian relations, see Burrell, Robert M. and Alvin J. Cot-
trell, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan: Tensions and .Dilemmas. Beverly Hills and London: 
Sage Publications, 1974 and Foot, Rosemary, "The Changing Pattern of Afghanistan's 
Relations with its Neighbors." Asian Affairs, Volume II, No. I, February 1980, pp. 55-
62. 
4. For more information on the formation and early operations of AITC, see the 
excellent article by John S. Gallagher, "Improving Transport to Expand Exports," Inter-
national Trade Forum, Vol. 15, No.2, April-June 1979, pp. 18-22. This article also con-
tains valuable material on other aspects of Afghan transit problems. 
5. Afghanistan has high hopes for expanded trade with the Gulf States, and the 
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Of Afghanistan's four neighbors, China alone offers no feasible 
overland transit route to and from the sea. Their common boundary 
at the eastern extremity of the Wakhan Corridor runs through about 
fifty miles of exceedingly difficult country. The corridor itself is use-
less as a transit route. It has only primitive roads which are impassi-
ble for any wheeled vehicles in winter, and besides, it leads nowhere. 
Not for some time, if ever, is China likely to provide useful overland 
transit to Afghanistan. 
After the partition of India in 1947, both India and Pakistan 
continued the practice derived from the Anglo-Afghan Trade Con-
vention of collecting customs duties on Afghan goods in transit and 
subjecting them to routine bureaucratic procedures, refunding the 
duties on goods transported over the established routes. This device, 
used to protect against diversion of both inbound and outbond 
goods, meant not only delays in the transit of goods, but delays of 
three to six months in the refunds of the duties. This situation was 
obviously inappropriate for Arghanistan, and in 1952 India and Af-
ghanistan signed a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce which in 
Article 15 provided transit facilities for Afghanistan. These facilities 
have been detailed and revised in a number of subsequent 
agreements. 
Transit across India is not very important, however. Far more 
important is Indo-Afghan trade, which involves transit across Paki-
stan, whether by road, rail or air. Since partition the railroad con-
necting Peshawar and the Afghan border with the Indian rail 
network at Amritsar has been used only intermittently because of 
political differences between India and Pakistan. Usually, though, 
the Afghans prefer to ship by truck since highway transport between 
Kabul and Amritsar takes only one-third as long as rail transport 
between Landi Khana and Amritsar and trucks on the Afghan por-
tion. Goods do not have to be transshipped or inspected enroute. 
The trucks are sealed in Afghanistan or India and only the seals are 
inspected in Pakistan. The most important highway used in Afghan 
transit across Pakistan to and from India is the old Grand Trunk 
Road which runs from Peshawar through Lahore and Delhi to Cal-
cutta. The routes across Pakistan, however, are used for seasonal 
fruit traffic only; all other Indian traffic goes through Karachi and 
any Afghan goods in transit through India use the port of Bombay. 
UN, through its special project for the least developed land-locked States of Asis, is as-
sisting these efforts. So far, however, the trade is very small, mostly in Afghan exports of 
carpets and rugs to Saudi Arabia, nuts to Kuwait, and a little fresh fruit to several coun-
tries. Most of this trade will probably have to use air transport. 
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While only about 20 percent of Afghan third party trade passed 
through Karachi in 1975, this digure may be misleading on two 
counts. First, most of Afghanistan's high bulk-low value imports use 
the Pakistan transit route, especially those from the Americas and 
Asia; and second, the volume appears to have risen considerably 
since 1975, though accurate statistics are lacking. Some exports go 
out through Karachi also, but not much and no statistics are avail-
able. Afghan transit trade, moreover, is not very important to the 
port of Karachi, amounting to about 1-2 percent of its total volume. 
Pakistan Railways carries the bulk of Afghan intransit goods 
between Karachi and the railheads near the Afghan border, Chaman 
and Peshawar. There is a railroad between Peshawar and Landi 
Khana near the Khyber Pass, but because of the terrain and its poor 
condition it is little used. Goods are generally carried by truck be-
tween Peshawar and Afghanistan. The route from Jacobabad to 
Quetta to Chaman has excess capacity but it faces the same topo-
graphic problems as the Peshawar-Landi Khana route and unless 
extended through southern Afghanistan to Iran - as has been pro-
posed- is unlikely to carry much more traffic than it does now. 
The Pakistani road system needs considerable improvement and the 
government severely restricts transit traffic by road, so the Karachi-
Peshawar rail route remains Afghanistan's primary highway through 
Pakistan. 
Most Afghan transit trade, especially exports, now moves over 
the Soviet rail system from three "ports" on the Soviet-Afghan bor-
der. This transit traffic in 1978 amounted to 26.5 percent of all goods 
crossing the border, the rest being trade between the two countries.6 
The Soviet company Sojuzvneshtrans handles all transit to and from 
the border ports and accepts Afghan imports at European ports and 
at Soviet ports and railroad stations. Afghan exports through the 
Soviet Union consist largely of carpets, hides and skins, wool, furs, 
oil seeds and nuts. Imports include equipment, farm machinery, 
rolled steel, paper and cardboard. 
Generally speaking, the Soviet transit route is efficient and flex-
ible, though delays are often encountered because of shortages of 
6. Garin, S. ''Transit Route via USSR," in UNCT AD; ESCAP and Ministry of 
Commerce, Seminar on Special Problems of Shipping and Receiving Goods in Afghanistan. 
Kabul, June 1979. All the material on routes within the USSR comes from this source 
and from Kramarov, E. "Problems in the Transit Trade of Land-locked Developing 
Countries," Foreign Trade (Moscow) No.3, 1971, p. 50. Another useful article is 
Zhinkin, V., ''Transit Traffic Across Soviet Territory, Foreign Trade No.I, 1972, pp. 48-
49. 
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railway wagons, overloaded ports and other problems. And it is not 
cheap, nor is the system yet geared to the extensive use of containers, 
only about 4,000 being used in 1978. Soviet ports and stations used 
fro Afghan trade with third parties depend on the origins and desti-
nations of the goods. Generally, Odessa is used for trade with Mar-
seilles; Zhdanov and Kerch for Italian ports; Leningrad for Britain 
and North America; Talinn for Scandinavia; Klaipeda for West Ger-
many; Chop for Czechoslovakia, Hungry, Austria and Western Eu-
rope; Brest for Poland, East Germany and Western Europe; Znjajka 
for Finland and Sweden; and Ungeny for Romania. Other ports and 
stations used are Riga, Ventspils, Kaliningrad and Viborg on the 
Baltic; Iljichevsk and Novorosisk on the Black Sea; Nak.hoda, Vladi-
vostok and Vostochni on the Pacific; and Termez and Kushka on the 
Afghan border. 
The three transshipment points for Afghan goods transiting the 
Soviet Union are the Amu Darya ports of Sherk.han Bandar and 
Hairatan Bandar opposite Termez and the "dry port" of Torghundi, 
five kilometers from the Soviet town of Kushka. Hairatan handles 
somewhat more traffic than Sherk.han and nearly double the tonnage 
of Torghundi, the newest of the northern ports, established in 1973.7 
Hairatan replaces the old port of Tashgozer, whose port was 
abandoned because of the unstable river bank. Hairatan is about 80 
km. from Mazar-i-Sharif and 217 km. from Kabul. Eventually, 
however, it will be able to serve the southern provinces after a paved 
road to Herat is constructed. Goods are barged across the river to 
and from Termez, 12 km. away. A combination highway-railroad 
bridge connecting the ports was proposed many years ago and was in 
the planning stage before the Soviet invasion. Apparently the 
Soviets finally built it - primarily for their own use. Hairatan has 
quite inadequate transit facilities; nevertheless its traffic continues to 
grow as indicated by the representative figures below. 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1977-78 
Traffic Through Hairatan Bandar (tons) 
Imports 
57,702 
61,342 
100,555 
Exports 
56,523 
61,093 
72,540 
Total 
116,225 
122,435 
173,095 
7. Until 1978 all statistics relating to Afghanistan's foreign trade were conjectural. 
One of the major accomplishments of Project RAS/72/077 was to establish an informa-
tion monitoring system at the three northern ports so that more recent figures represent 
reasonably accurate estimates. 
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Sherkhan Bandar, about 65 km. north of Kunduz and 404 km. 
from Kabul, has less favorable site than Hairatan because of great 
seasonal fluctuations in the water level. The riverbank has been 
paved, however, and barges can tie up alongside so goods can be 
transferred directly to and from trucks. It has five covered ware-
houses compared with two in Hairatan and both ports have sizable 
open - and unpaved - space for storage. Tugs tow open steel 
barges between Sherkhan a~d Termez, a distance of about 180 km., 
in about three to four days, depending on the current. The Soviets 
are responsible for the maintenance of the river- dredging, mark-
ing, lighting etc. The post serves Kabul and occasionally such dis-
tant places as Kandahar and J alalabad. 
1972-73 
1974-75 
1977-78 
Traffic Through Sherkhan Bandar (tons) 
Imports 
65,441 
48,359 
79,983 
Exports 
46,329 
41,472 
43,565 
Total 
111,770 
89,931 
123,549 
Torghundi is connected to Herat by 113 km. of good highway. 
It is 681 km. from Kandahar and 1165 km. from Kabul. Through 
Mazar it serves the northern provinces effectively. The Soviet rail-
way enters Afghanistan in one line and then branches out near 
Torghundi into sidings and shunting facilities. The Soviets are re-
sponsible for all railroad equipment and maintenance, rail move-
ments and everything else connected with the railroad. The port has 
two covered and two open warehouses and ample open space. Like 
the other two ports, it has inadequate facilities and equipment, but 
unlike the others it has adequate manpower. Traffic through the 
port is erratic, but is gradually building up. Samp~e figures follow: 
1974-75 
1977-78 
Traffic Flow through Torghundi (tons) 
Imports 
47,692 
73,059 
Exports 
22,464 
25,722 
Total 
70,156 
98,781 
Interestingly, Torghundi is also a transshipment point for Pakis-
tani transit traffic. This is handled by the Soviet company Afsotr. In 
1977-78 this traffic amounted to 189 containers of imports and 2215 
tons of exports. 
Air transport, both domestic and international, is increasingly 
important to Afghanistan. It began in 1944, when the first office of 
civil air services was established and the first foreign planes began 
serving the country regularly, though there had been occasional 
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flights from the Soviet Union since 1927 and from Germany since 
1937. Ariana Afghan Airlines, organized in January 1955, was reor-
ganized in 1957, with 51 percent of it owned by the government and 
49 percent by Pan American World Airlines, which managed it. In 
January 1971 Bakhtar Airlines took over its internal routes. Though 
still very modest, the growth of Mghan air transport is indicated by 
the figures for total international cargo loaded and unloaded at 
Kabul, in metric tons: 1969- 3,382; 1974-5,100, compared with 
the 1978-79 total for Ariana alone of 5,161 metric tons.8 
The number of foreign cities served, the distances flown and the 
frequency of flights have all increased significantly since 1974, as 
well as the volume and variety of goods carried. During the summer 
of 1979, according to Hamid, Ariana offered five flights a week to 
western Europe, two to the Soviet Union and four to India, of which 
two were all freight. The cargoes are essentially the same high 
value-low bulk goods recently being carried increasingly by truck: 
Karakul, carpets, dried fruits, electronics, spare parts, textiles, tea, 
spices, etc. 
(b) Afghan Transit Problems 
In 1967 and again in 1971 a French expert serving with the Af-
ghan Ministry of Commerce did studies of the Mghan transit sys-
tem. In 1971 he recommended the creation of a government body to 
handle all transit traffic, more rail transport and more use of contain-
ers, railroads from Chaman in Pakistan to Spin Boldak inside M-
ghanistan and across Iran to connect Mghanistan with Western 
Europe, a railroad bridge across the Amu Darya at Termez, a high-
way along the Helmand River and thence to Bandar Abbas in Iran 
where Afghanistan should have a free port, and a customs-free ware-
house in Karachi.9 In the decade since then, some progress has been 
made, notably in the establishment of the AITC and the production 
of a large number of important studies by the UN project of assist-
ance to the least developed land-locked countries of Asia, but the 
basic problems described in detail by Jacquemond, Ackermann, 
Thomas and other foreign experts remain. 
8. The earlier figures are from Amid, Hamidullah and Gordon B. Schilz, A Geogra-
phy of Afghanistan, Omaha: Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska at 
Omaha, 1976, p. 144. The latest one is from A.A. Hamid's paper "Role of Air Transport 
in Afghanistan" read at the Kabul seminar cited in note 6. 
9. Jacquemond, J.B. "Etude de Mesures propres a ameliorer les transports pour le 
commerce exterieur et assurer le desenclavement de 1' Afghanistan," Kabul: Afghani-
stan, Ministry of Commerce, June 30, 1971. 
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Rail, road and port facilities in Iran are still inadequate to han-
dle significant volumes of Afghan transit traffic efficiently and eco-
nomically, there are too many people taking bribes to smooth the 
way through the country and the whole situation is exacerbated by 
civil commotion and the war with Iraq, conditions over which Af-
ghanistan has no influence whatever. Afghan trucks are still notal-
lowed to cross Pakistan into India, which means goods must be 
transshipped at least twice during a relatively short journey, and 
overland trade is essentially limited to fresh fruits exported from Af-
ghanistan. Even the Soviet transit route, and best of all, has 
problems with sporadic shortages of wagons and delays in payments 
to Afghan exporters. The major difficulties, however, are still with 
the Pakistan transit route. 
In the port of Karachi, Afghan goods are piled in the open with 
no security and no protection from the elements. They are moved 
about from place to place at the discretion of the port authorities, 
suffering damage with each move, and the Karachi Port Trust does 
not pay for lost or damaged goods. Railway wagons are chronically 
insufficient and Afghan goods incur high wharfage and demurrage 
charges waiting for them. Pakistan offered space for an Afghan 
warehouse, but it was distant from the water and outside the security 
area, so the Afghans rejected it. Clearing and forwarding are very 
complex procedures. Many documents, steps and signatures are nec-
essary. One small mistake in a document can hold up a shipment for 
a month or longer. Imported goods frequently disappear from 
sealed wagons before they arrive at Chaman or Peshawar. Similar 
problems are found in these transshipment points and in addition 
there is the problem of obtaining trucks, whose availability fluctuates 
seasonally, for onward shipment to Afghanistan. 
Exports suffer in the same way and in addition, they often arrive 
at the Karachi port after the ship on which they were booked has 
sailed and have to be stored until the arrival of another ship bound 
for their destination. Not only does this add to the monetary cost of 
the goods in their eventual market, but the cost in terms of reputa-
tion for reliable delivery is incalculable. 
All of these delays, damages and disappearances increase con-
siderably the cost of insurance, which has to be paid by the ultimate 
purchaser of the goods, whether in Afghanistan or elsewhere. Even 
air freight has problems, including lack of operating permission into 
many countries, high cost of fuel, storage of Kabul airport which has 
been described as "a nightmare for the airline community," cumber-
some formalities and competition from trucks. especially when some 
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goods best sent overland are sent by air, creating backlogs for legiti-
mate air cargoes. 
Some progress is being made in resolving some of these 
problems. The UN project discussed earlier has made many valua-
ble studies which can aid in planning improvements in transit facili-
ties and procedures. It has helped Afghanistan negotiate favorable 
transit agreements with Bulgaria and Switzerland and was slated to 
do the same with other European countries. It has identified the 
needs for and helped channel $70,000 from the United Nations Spe-
cial Fund for Land-locked Developing Countries to Torghundi for 
desperately needed equipment. It has established a Transit Traffic 
Information Monitoring System in Chaman, Pewhawar and Kara-
chi. It has made recommendations which, if implemented, could re-
lieve Afghanistan's transit plight. But few of them are likely to be 
implemented without Pakistan's cooperation, which is unlikely to be 
forthcoming very soon for several reasons. 
Pakistan insists that transit is strictly a bilateral matter, to be 
worked out between the land-locked state and the transit state, with 
no participation by any third party, including the United Nations. 
Pakistan is also wary of dealings with Afghanistan because of the 
Pushtunistan issue and the real possibility of her own dismember-
ment. Finally, Pakistan is herself a poor country and really cannot 
afford to provide all of the facilities and equipment necessary to im-
prove Afghanistan's transit situation dramatically. A large measure 
of mutual good will and cooperation will be necessary to accomplish 
this goal but, considering the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, that 
now seems more distant than ever. 
4. NEPAL 
Nepal, like Afghanistan, is dominated by mountains, but the 
mountains - the Himalayas - lie in the north, along the China 
border, rather than in the center as in Afghanistan. The middle zone 
in Nepal, where most of the people live, is called "the hills," though 
these hills frequently reach nearly 2,800 meters in altitude. The 
southernmost belt is called the Terai and is part of the Ganges plain. 
The country is drained by many rivers, most of them flowing out of 
the Himalayas generally southward and into the Ganges. The entire 
country is subject to the monsoon, but climate varies greatly with 
altitude. The Terai was once covered with a heavy subtropical for-
est, interspersed with malarial swamps, but as soon as malaria was 
eradicated from the region in the 1950's through American aid, set-
20 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
tlers moved in from the north and south, cleared most of the forests, 
and planted rice, jute and other crops. 
Nepal is still almost entirely an agricultural country. Some light 
industries are located in the northern outskirts of Kathmandu, and 
Biratnager, in the Terai near the Indian border, is slated to be the 
country's principal industrial center, but total industrial production 
is still very small. Despite some extensive geological surveys, to date 
no extensive deposits of commercially useful minerals have been 
found. Unless some are found and can be conveniently exploited, 
Nepal is likely to remain largely agricultural and her vast hydroelec-
tric power resources will be tapped primarily for export. 
Foreign trade statistics are usually grouped into three catego-
ries, those with India, with Tibet and with overseas, or third coun-
tries. Of these the trade with India is overwhelmingly important. 
Nepal has traditionally been essentially an economic appendage of 
India, and one of her major foreign policy objectives in the last two 
decades has been to reduce this dependence and diversify her mar-
kets and sources of supply. These efforts have achieved considerable 
success. during the 1970's particularly there was a notable drop in 
the proportion of Indian trade in Nepal's total foreign trade, from 
74.9 percent of her exports and 67.7 percent of her imports in 1975-
76 to only 43.5 percent of exports and 58.1 percent of imports in 
1977-78.10 As overseas trade has become steadily more important to 
Nepal, so have her transit arrangements. 
Nepal is not only land-locked, she is also, as is frequently noted 
by Nepalese, "India-locked." Her only other neighbor, China, has 
never been and is not likely to be an important transit state for Ne-
pal because of the Himalayas and the great distance between Nepal 
and the Pacific Ocean through China. For a number of years there 
have been many proposals for a regular air serivde between Kath-
mandu and Beijing and Hong Kong, but none has been initiated yet. 
So India is the sole provider of transit for Nepal. 
Prior to 1950, Nepal had virtually no trade with countries other 
than India and, to a small degree, with Tibet. Thus, there was no 
need for transit arrangements. Then in July 1950, India and Nepal 
signed a Treaty of Trade and Commerce of which Articles 1, 2, and 
4 dealt with transit. Article 1 read, "The Government of India rec-
10. Nepal Overseas Trade Statistics 1977-78. Kathmandu: Trade Promotion Centre, 
1978, p. 168. Trade with Tibet, mostly Nepalese rice for Tibetan wool and Chinese con-
sumer goods, remained rather constant during this period at about 2.8 percent of Nepal's 
exports and 9.5 percent of imports. 
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ognizes in favour of the Government of Nepal full and unrestricted 
right of commercial transit of all goods and manufacturers through 
the territory and ports of India as provided in Articles 2, 3 and 4 
below." At the first glance, this seemed to be a very generous provi-
sion, and, indeed, it was insofar as it recognized that Nepal had a 
full and unrestricted right of transit through India, but this right was 
limited to commercial transit, did not cover persons or baggage, and 
was further restricted by the phrasing of Articles 2 and 4. 
Though many important aspects of any transit arrangement 
were entirely ommitted from the treaty, it might have been adequate 
for a while if interpreted and administered liberally by India, but for 
Article 5. This article required Nepal to levy both import and export 
duties on goods traded with third countries at rates not lower than 
those of India for the same goods. In addition, Nepalese exports to 
India were required to bear export duties high enough to prevent 
their being sold_ in India at prices lower than those of domestic goods 
which bore high taxes. Thus, Nepal was prohibited from competing 
effectively with Indian products, either within India or Nepal, or in 
foreign markets. The growth of Nepalese industry was stifled even 
as the overthrow of the century-old autocratic rule by prime minis-
ters of the Rana family opened the country for the first time to eco-
nomic development and foreign trade. Nepal was thus unable to 
take full advantage of even the limited transit rights granted by the 
1950 treaty. 
The next decade saw many changes in Nepal, India, and the 
legal status of land-locked states in the world. By 1960, it was clear 
to both countries that the 1950 treaty was inadequate and a new, 
more elaborate, treaty was negotiated and signed in September, 
1960. The treaty was supplemented by a protocol and memoran-
dum, signed simultaneously with the treaty, which detailed the pro-
cedures to be used in moving Nepalese goods in transit through 
India. 
The 1960 Treaty of Trade and Transit, while to some extent 
freeing Nepal's foreign trade from its linkage to India's international 
trade policies, was nevertheless based on India's policy at the time of 
working toward a common market of the two countries. Transit was 
not mentioned at all in the preamble, and only four articles of the 
fourteen dealt with transit between Nepal and third countries 
through India. These provided for limited freedom of transit 
through each other's territory, a definition of ''traffic in transit" lim-
iting it to goods (including baggage), exemption of traffic in transit 
from customs duties, and a commitment that "traffic in transit shall 
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not be subjected to unnecessary delays or restrictions" if the protocal 
was complied with. 
One important improvement of the 1960 treaty over the 1950 
treaty was that it provided for a special shed in the port of Calcutta 
for the termporary storage of Nepalese goods in transit. Another 
was that it permitted the stationing of Nepalese Customs Liaison Of-
ficers in Calcutta and Barauni, the major trans-shipment point be-
tween Indian broad gauge and meter gauge railways. These 
advances were, however, wiped out by the requirement that import-
ers and exporters post "a bond with suitable guarantee" that the 
goods will not be diverted enroute. While this provision was recip-
rocal, it applied in practice only to businessmen in Nepal as a device 
to prevent Nepalese imports and exports from finding their way into 
the Indian market, where many of these products were extremely 
costly or prohibited altogether. Requiring the buyer or seller to 
gruarantee delivery of goods over which he had no control while in 
transit, mostly via Indian Railways, was strange enough, but setting 
the bond as high as six hundred percent of the value of the goods 
simply made it impossible for many importers to operate. It took 
three years of intensive negotiations for Nepal to win abolition of 
this bond system. 
The memorandum accompanying the 1960 treaty detailed elab-
orate procedures for handling imports and exports in transit. The 
principal weaknesses in these procedures, aside from the bonding 
system, were: inspection and sealing of individual packages in a 
shipment by customs; Indian use of the Nepalese import and export 
licenses as devices to prevent smuggling; and the application of the 
same elaborate procedures to goods moving in transit by air as by 
land. 
During the next several years, a number of modifications were 
made in the procedures and facilities to ease some of the difficulties 
in moving Nepal's transit traffic. Nepal's transit through India, how-
ever, continued to be restricted in various ways in order to aid in the 
enforcement of India's restrictive import policy. Indian attitudes to-
ward Nepal, moreover, were also made evident as India graciously 
or grudgingly, on various occasions, made concessions to Nepal on 
small but important matters. 
The 1960 treaty was renewed in 1965 for another five years. Ne-
gotiations for a new treaty began in 1970 and dragged on well past 
the expiration date of the 1960 treaty, October 31, 1970. They finally 
culminated in a new treaty signed on August 13, 1971, to come into 
force on the 15th. In the eleven years that had passed between the 
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two treaties, conditions had changed even more radically than in the 
previous decade. 
Nepal's Export Exchange Entitlement Scheme (EEE), intro-
duced in 1961 to stimulate exports of Nepalese goods which could 
not compete in price in world markets, was successful to some degree 
in increasing exports but had the more important effect of sharply 
increasing imports, particularly of luxury goods, some of which 
found their way into India. This made free and unrestricted transit 
more necessary for Nepal and more of a threat to India. New tech-
nologies, acceleration of Nepal's economic development, changing 
India-Nelap-China relationships, and Nepal's continuing economic 
dependence on India were some of the other factors that contributed 
to the protracted negotiations. The result was a treaty that differed 
substantially from its predecessors. 
The Preamble to the 1971 Treaty of Trade and Transit still 
stressed bilateral trade and mentioned transit only in passing. 
Article VIII stated, "The Contracting Parties shall accord to 
'traffic in transit' freedom of transit across their respective territories 
through routes mutually agreed upon." This was a vague enough 
commitment but preceded a second paragraph rpoviding, especially 
to India, a gigantic loophole: "Each Contracting Party shall have 
the right to take all indispensable measures to ensure that such free-
dom, accorded by it on its territory, does not in any way infringe its 
legitimate interests of any kind." 
For the first time in a treaty, India, in Article XI, agreed to pro-
vide more than one transit facility for Nepal, but only "warehouses 
or sheds for the storage of transit cargo awaiting customs clearance 
before onward transmission," only "at point or points of entry or 
exit" and "subject to relevent laws and regulations prevailing in 
India." 
Article XII virtually reproduced Article X of the 1960 treaty, 
saying that "traffic in transit shall not be subject to avoidable delays 
or restrictions" except in case of failure to comply with the proce-
dures laid down in the protocol. 
Article XIV denied freedom of transit to goods imported from 
one party by the other and re-exported to third countries. It went on 
to commit each party to prevent certain kinds of re-exports 
altogether. 
Article XV, for the first time, granted "merchant ships, sailing 
under the flag of Nepal," with certain qualifications, most-favored-
nation treatment in Indian ports and harbors. 
The protocol was much more detailed than that of 1960. It 
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specified both the sheds and open space in Calcutta port made avail-
able for Nepal's transit cargo and the general terms of the leases for 
them. It gave Nepal for the first time authority to own and/or oper-
ate trucks and barges in the port area, and, also for the first time, 
authorized transit goods to move by road. Another important addi-
tion was the establishment of a Joint Review Committee (JRC) to 
deal with problems which might arise in implementing the treaty. 
Nepal, however, was restricted to using Calcutta as the sole seaport 
for her traffic in transit and eleven towns near the Nepal border as 
entry and exit points. There was also a number of other restrictions 
on the free flow of transit traffic and a long list of procedures 
designed to prevent smuggling. 11 
Since the 1971 treaty was due to expire in 1976, the Government 
of Nepal began preparing to negotiate a new treaty. The Indian po-
sition was that the existing treaty was quite satisfactory and should 
be renewed with only minor technical changes. Nepal, however, was 
very unhappy with it and determined to strive for the best possible 
transit and trade arrangements. Negotiations began in the summer 
of 1976, just before the expiration of the 1971 treaty. On Nepalese 
insistence, this treaty was extended indefinitely while negotiations 
continued on and off for nearly two years. Finally, on March 17, 
1978, Nepalese patience and negotiating skill paid off as the new 
Janata government, which had replaced that of Indira Gandhi, 
reached agreement with Nepal. 
The 1978 arrangements represent a distinct advance for Nepal 
at all three levels, those of principles, facilities and procedures for 
traffic in transit. First, Nepal won her point that transit and bilateral 
trade are entirely separate matters and should be covered in separate 
treaties. In addition, the problem of smuggling, which had long 
vexed Nepal-India relations, was covered in a third agreement "to 
control unauthorized trade." Transit was further distinguished from 
trade by giving the tyransit treaty a duration of seven years with an 
optional seven-year renewal, while the other two had dura~ions of 
only five years plus a possible renewal for five more years. This was 
a very significant concession by India. 
The terms of the treaty are virtually identical to the transit pro-
visions of the 1971 treaty, but the accompanying protoool (which 
deals with transit facilities) and memorandum (which spells out 
11. The foregoing material on Nepal's trade and transit treaties is drawn from 
Glassner, Martin Ira, "Transit Rights for Land-locked States and the Special Case of 
Nepal," World Affairs, Vol. 140, No.4, Spring 19?8, pp. 307-310. 
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transit procedures) are more favorable to Nepal than the documents 
they replace. Furthermore, exchange of letters between the parties 
which accompany the three main documents provide for Nepalese 
transit across the Naxalbari corridor for the first time in order to 
permit implementation of the 1976 Nepal-Bangladesh transit treaty 
which for the first time offers Nepal transit routes and ports other 
than Calcutta. Another exchange of letters agrees to establishment 
of an Inter-Governmental Committee "consisting of the senior rep-
resentatives of the two Governments to promote trade, facilitate 
transit and control unauthorised trade between the two countries 
... "to meet every six months. While it would have been better to 
have two or three separate committees, this is still a better arrange-
ment for resolving differences between the parties than the previous 
one. 
(a) Nepal's Transit Routes and Facilities 
Of all Indian seaports which could be useful to Nepal in trading 
with third countries, India permits her to use only Calcutta. There 
she has the use of space in three warehouses, none of which is really 
adequate. One, in fact, the only one on the water, had been unsuita-
ble for years because of its poor contition and was recently aban-
doned. She has also the use of about 4300 square meters of open 
space. Recently she was offered space in the new port of Haldia, 
some 20 miles down the Hooghly River from Calcutta, but turned it 
down because it was far from the water. Nevertheless, Haldia is a 
modem port designed to accomodate large ships than Calcutta and 
to handle containers and bulk cargo. Some Nepalese cargoes have 
used Haldia and its use by Nepal is likely to increase slowing in the 
near future. It has one major drawback, however, which at least for 
the present makes it less attractive than it might be for Nepal. It is 
under the control of the Calcutta Port Trust and therefore subject to 
the same inefficiencies, strikes and charges as in Calcutta. 
Besides insufficient and deteriorated storage space in Calcutta 
port, Nepal traffic in transit suffers long delays because of shortages 
of railway wagons, cumbersome procedures involving much 
paperwork and many signatures, and very restrictive labor regula-
tions. The only time in memory when Nepalese goods move expedi-
tiously through Calcutta and to and from Nepal was during the 
"emergency" declared by Indira Gandhi during the late 1970s. Few 
would want that system reinstated, but it did demonstrate how rap-
idly intransit cargoes can be moved if the transit state is willing. 
One of the characteristics of the Indian Railways is that they use 
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several different gauges. Generally speaking, the railroads between 
Calcutta and the Ganges are broad gauge (5'4"), while north of the 
river meter gauge predominates. This means that rail shipments 
moving between Nepal and Calcutta must be transshipped, adding 
hazards of delay, damage and pilferage enroute as well as at the port 
and the border. Indian Railways is currently engaged in a gradual 
conversion of the meter-gauge tracks to broad gauge and perhaps by 
1990 the tracks must commonly used by Nepalese transit traffic will 
be converted. Meanwhile, Barauni is the major transshipment point, 
with Gorakhpur and Katihar being other important ones. 
Currently the Indian railway system serves 19 points on the Ne-
pal border, of which 13 are approved under the 1978 transit treaty 
for Nepal's third country traffic. Two others, Kakarbhitta/Nax-
albari in India's sensitive Naxalbari corridor connecting Assam to 
the rest of the country, and Pashupatinagar/Sukhiapokhari, con-
tinue to be used on an ad hoc basis until the Indian Government 
decides whether to make them permanent. Of these points, Jogbani, 
near Biratnagar, handles most of Nepal's exports, consisting largely 
of agricultural products, primarily jute and jute products, and some 
imports, mostly fertilizers, cement and some capital and consumer 
goods for local regional markets. Raxaul, opposite the Nepalese 
town of Birgunj, handles most of Nepal's imports, especially high-
value goods going to the main population center of the Kathmandu 
valley and elsewhere in the country. 
Only one rail line is currently in use in Nepal, the narrow gauge 
line from Jayanagar in India to Janakpur. 12 There have been nu-
merous proposals to revive the Birgunj-Amelekganj line, abandoned 
in 1968, and to extend various Indian lines into Nepal, but so far 
none has actually been implemented. 13 Generally, goods are carried 
between points in Nepal and the Indian railheads and stations by 
Nepalese trucks. 
Nepalese trucks are also permitted to carry transit cargoes be-
tween Nepal and Calcutta, under conditions spelled out in the proto-
12. This line was constructed in 1935-38 and most of its rolling stock dates from that 
time. It is the only means of transportation in the area and in 1976 reached a level of one 
million passengers and about 32,000 tons of freight per year. The line is very badly in 
need of rehabilitation. 
13. The Nepal Transport Corporation operates a narrow gauge reilway which pro-
vides irregular service (two-three times per week) between Raxaul and Birgunj; it does 
not service the Nepal customs area along the highway and separate customs inspections 
take place at the Birgunj railway station. It is a high-cost, low-volume operation and 
may well be abandoned soon. 
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col and memorandum attached to the 1978 transit treaty. Nepal also 
uses - but does not own - warehouses and other storage facilities 
at some of the transshipment points. 
Nepal's international air transport is growing impressively, but 
most of it is passenger traffic, chiefly tourists. In 1979 air cargo 
amounted to only 1 percent of third country trade by volume and 
about 15 percent of its value. Exports constituted about 25 percent 
of total air cargoes and the proportion was rising. Most imports by 
air come from Asia (primarily Japan and Hong Kong), while exports 
by air go primarily to Europe and America. Only a very small por-
tion of air cargoes is carried by aircraft of the Royal Nepal Airlines 
Corporation. RNAC does not offer regular cargo service and cargo 
space is only made available when there is an insufficient passenger 
load. Thai International and other foreign airlines carry the bulk of 
air cargo. 
It seems unlikely that in the near future air transport will be-
come a major factor in Nepal's third country trade, despite the rec-
ommendations of many foreign experts. The problems are simply 
too great for a very poor country with many other priorities. There 
has long been insufficient storage space at Tribhuvan Airport, Kath-
mandu's air facility. Customs and handling procedures are cumber-
some. There is no equipment (lighting, instrumentation, etc.) for 
night takeoffs and landings, air cargo rates are very high and Nepal 
has insufficient agreements with other countries for landing rights, 
interline transfers and so on. As the growing tourist trade stimulates 
demand for Nepalese handicrafts, rugs and carpets, spices and other 
high-value products, and as growing Nepalese incomes permit the 
purchase of imported luxury goods, (in addition, of course, to luxury 
goods re-exported to India as part of the traditional "unrecorded 
trade"), air transport of freight should become more attractive and 
many of the problems listed here should receive higher priorities and 
be resolved without great difficulty. 
Another possible transit option for Nepal is river transport. A 
number of studies over the last twenty years or so have revealed that 
river transport within Nepal is infeasible because the larger rivers in 
the Terai are very shallow with constantly shifting beds. Transport 
on the Ganges, however, is rapidly becoming more practical. Immi-
nent completion of a lock canal around the Farakka Barrage should 
permit the Indian government to implement its plans for barge traffic 
between Calcutta and Varanasi, with possible extension up the Gan-
dak River. This inland waterway route could be cheaper by as much 
as abut 50 percent per ton mile than for railway freight, considering 
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potential savings in time, theft and damages. Nepalese trucks could 
carry goods between Nepal and various river ports, thus bypassing 
the railroads entirely. Under the protocal to the 1978 Treaty of 
Transit, Nepal has the right to own and/or operate barges within the 
Calcutta Port area; she could negotiate for similar rights on the Gan-
ges. This would enable her, especially in conjunction with LASH 
vessels, to transfer cargoes directly from ship to river to truck toNe-
pal and vice versa, thus avoiding most of the problems of Calcutta as 
well as of the Indian Railways. 
One more transit facility should be mentioned. There is a 42 
km. ropeway between Kathmandu and Hetaura over a much more 
direct route than the Tribhuvan Rajmarg, the tortuous highway built 
by the Indian Army in the 1950s to connect Kathmandu with India 
at Birgunj. Each of its carriers has a capacity of 1.21 cubic meters or 
544 kilos, and the system was designed to carry nearly 28 metric tons 
of goods per hour in each direction for 20 hours per day, 350 days 
per year, or about 152,000 tons per year in each direction. Its practi-
cal capacity, however, is only about 70,000 tons per year and in 
1967-67 it actually averaged only 35,000 tpy. The poor performance 
was due to technical problems, insufficient carriers, insufficient traffic 
and insufficient storage space in Kathmandu, resulting in erratic use 
- sometimes over burdened, sometimes unused. During the late 
1970s it was improved considerably and is not functioning better. 
Under consideration is its extension south to Amelekgunj or even 
Birgunj. Alternatively, the Raxaul-Amelekgunj railway might be re-
furbished, reopened and extended to Hetaura. In either case, there 
would be a direct rail-ropeway link, eliminating the truck haul be-
tween them. Some consideration is also being given to constructing 
other ropeways elsewhere in Nepal and even between Nepal and 
Bangladesh across the Naxalbari corridor. 
Various studies over the years have recommended that Nepal's 
traffic in transit use other Indian seaports besides Calcutta. There 
are good rail connections between Bombay and western Nepal, for 
example, and the new port of Paradip south of Calcutta is connected 
by broad-gauge lines all the way to the excellent new rail junction of 
New Jalpaiguri near the Bangladesh border and an easy truck jour-
ney to eastern Nepal. India had steadfastly refused, however, to per-
mit Nepal to use any other seaport and she is confined to Calcutta. 
Nepal has therefore turned to Chittagong in Bangladesh as an alter-
native port. 
Bangladesh has been quite cooperative in this matter and in 
1976 signed a most favorable transit treaty with Nepal. The treaty 
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could not be implemented, however, until India granted permission 
for Nepal transit cargoes going to or from Bangladesh to cross In-
dian territory and use Indian border crossing points. This was ef-
fected by a protocol to the Nepal-India Treaty of Transit in March 
1978 and a memorandum of understanding between India and Ban-
gladesh in August 1978. Transit shipments actually began in March 
1979, crossing the corder between Radhikapur, India and Birol, Ban-
gladesh. At present the best route is via all-meter-gauge railways 
between Chittagong and Jogbani, but this route is both long and be-
set by many problems. 
For one thing, the entire transportation system of East Pakistan 
was devastated during the war which led to the creation of Ban-
gladesh in 1971, and it has still not recovered. There is a shortage of 
railway rolling stock, insufficient bridges over the numerous rivers 
and there is a sporadic congestion in Chittagong port. There is, 
moreover, no procedure for passing required documents from Ban-
gladesh authorities at Birol to Indian customs in Radhikopur only 
six miles away, so that they must go from Birol to Chittagong to 
Kathmandu to Biratnagar to Radhikapur, a journey which takes 
about a month. Meanwhile, the wagons are detained at Radhikapur 
incurring huge demurrage charges. Other procedural impediments 
and India's refusal to permit road transit through this security area 
between Nepal and Bangladesh add to the delays and costs enroute. 
Chittagong port itself is much better for Nepal's traffic in transit 
than Calcutta ports, since port charges are lower, handling is more 
efficient and customs formalities less cumbersome than at Calcutta. 
Nepal currently uses three sheds in Chittagong port, one of them in 
poor condition, and the port authorities are constructing a large 
warehouse exclusively for Nepalese goods. The distance between 
Chittagong and Jogbani, however, is 428 km. longer than from Cal-
cutta to Jogbani, the journey across Bangladesh to Radhikapur takes 
7-10 days, and the freight rates are higher than on the Indian Rail-
ways. Because of these factors, Chittagong has been little used for 
Nepalese exports and primarily for infrequent imports of cememt, 
fertilizers, grains and other bulk cargoes. There are a number of 
possible alternatives to this all-meter-gauge route between Chit-
tagong and Nepal, including various combinations of broasd-and 
meter-gauge railroads, waterways and trucks. The most attractive 
alternative is to use the port of Chalna south of Dacca rather than 
Chittagong. There are difficulties here, however, because of silting 
in the port, inadequate lighting for night navigation and high port 
charges. Most important, however, is the lack of roads and railways 
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at Chalna. Rail and road connections with Khulna upstream are 
planned and when completed Chalna might be an excellent transit 
port for Nepal. One other uncertainty remains, however; India has 
not yet granted permission for Nepal to use the most feasible border 
crossing point, at Haldibari south of Jalpaiguri. As with the Chit-
tagong route, there are other possible routes to and from Chalna, but 
they have not yet been studied in detail. No matter which routes 
through Bangladesh prove technically and economically feasible, 
however, all will require the full cooperation of India, which is not 
certain to be forthcoming. 
(b) Nepal's Transit Problems 
A number of Nepal's problems with air and waterway transit 
and with the Bangladesh route have already been discussed, though 
a great deal more detail could be added. Here we shall concentrate 
on a resume of the problems with the Calcutta-Nepal road and rail 
transit and what is being done to resolve them. 
First, it should be stated that Nepalese transit through Calcutta 
has considerably improved overall during the past half dozen years, 
particularly since the entry into force ofthe 1978 transit treaty. Sec-
ond, some of the problems of inadequate facilities and equipment 
stem from India's own economic conditions and are endured by her 
own shippers as well as those of Nepal. Third, some of the restric-
tions and complex documentation and cumbersome procedures in-
sisted upon by India stem from a legitimate desire to reduce 
smuggling from Nepal to India of imported goods (as well as rice, 
timber, jute and other Nepalese products) across their open border 
and to reduce "deflection" of imports before they reach the Nepalese 
border. Fourth, as noted earlier, there is a serious imbalance in the 
direction of Nepal's imports and exports which makes it difficult and 
costly to have sufficient railway wagons where and when they are 
needed and to find sufficient return cargoes for both wagons and 
trucks. Finally, some of Nepal's transit problems are of her own 
making since the government is not yet fully committed to industri-
alization, export expansion or improved transit and so there are in-
adequate facilities, cumbersome procedures, and lack of 
coordination and planning in transit matters within Nepal. 
SELECTED DATA ON INDIAN RAILWAYS 
serving Nepal Border Points 
1979 
Distance between Station and 
Gate~ Nearest Class I Railway Third Country 
Rly Stn. Nepal Customs Calcutta Routing Tariff to Calcutta Ex~orts Imports 
(1978-79) 
km km via Indian Rupee per ton Tons sooo sooo 
I. Kanchanpur Banbasa 4 1282 Philibit-Shahjahanpur 231.0 n.a. n.a. 166 
1251 Lucknow 227.7 2. Dhangadi Gauri Phanta • I 1221 Gonda - Barauni 221.2 2,850 1043 345 
3. Rajapur Tikonia 3'h 1151 Gonda - Barauni 214.1 included in Dhangadi 
4. Nepalgunj Nepalgunj Road* l'h 1089 Gonda - Barauni 202.8 4,368 2135 2248 
5. Koilabas Jarwa• 5 985 Gorakhpur - Barauni 187.9 n.a. n.a. 435 
6. Krishnanagar Barhni 'h 947 Gorakhpur - Barauni 180.5 500 165 198 
7. Bhairawa Nautanwa• 8'h 892 Gorakhpur - Barauni 173.0 1424 441 6644 
8. Birgunj Raxaul I 717 Darbhanga - Darauni 142.2 9576 10229 73274 696 Sagauli - Barauni 
9. Jaleswar Sitamahri 30 641 Darbhanga - Barauni 134.3 4334 1396 367 
10. Janak pur Jayanager• 29 641 Darbhanga - Barauni 134.3 3316** 1886** 33 
II. Setubhand Forbesgunj 48 516 Katihar 113.9 12067 3964 
12. Biratnagar Jog bani appr. 200m 530 Katihar 115.3 62770 30679 7185 
13. Bhadrapur Galgalia 4 543 Barsoi 118.6 5920 2184 
14 Kakarvitta (Mechi) Naxalbari 3 564 Barsoi 121.7 13931 5456 29 
Source: Data compiled by UNCTAD/ESCAP Team 
*Indicate branch line terminal ••Does not include exports via Siraha 
Notes:• All stations provide daily service 
--*Import/export data represent gateway totals which include truck as well as railway traffic; for imports, conversion to tonnage will be completed at a later date. 
*Stations I to 10 are served by North eastern Railway; Stations II to 14 by Northeast Frontier Ry. 
*Distance by truck Raxaul - Calcutta is 868 km and the tariff per ton is IC 250 
*Distance by truck Biratnagar - Calcutta is 580 km and the tariff per ton is IC 180 
*Bullock carts are frequently used for transport between Nepal customs and railway stations when the distance does not exceed 10 km. 
~ 
~ 
z 
til 
-~ 
~ 
::0 
0 
= I'"' 
rn 
::: 
til 
I.U 
-
32 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
Nepal's third country exports, like those of most developing 
countries, consist largely of agricultural products and handicrafts. In 
1977-78, over one-third of the value of Nepal's exports came from 
raw jute and jute goods, down from over 90 percent in 1971-72, an 
indication of some success in attempts to diversity exports. Rice ac-
counted for another fifth, another significant factor since rice exports 
only began in 1973-74. Other important exports overseas are hides 
and skins, handicrafts, carpets, large cardamom, tumeric, oil cake, 
dry ginger, linseed and rice bran cake, in that order. Exports go pri-
marily to Belgium, West Germany, Singapore, France, China, Ja-
pan, HongKong, Italy and Poland, in that order. Her imports 
consist primarily of manufactured goods, of which the most impor-
tant by far are textiles and petroleum products. Others are machin-
ery and parts, aircraft and parts, fertilizers, motor vehicles and 
motorcycles and their parts and accessories, and a variety of other 
products. These come from Japan (about 14 percent), USA, China, 
the Soviet Union and Korea, with lesser amounts coming from the 
UK, West Germany, Hong Kong, Singapore and Thailand. 14 
All but a small amount of this trade passes through Calcutta, 
where the list of problems is long indeed: frequent strikes, inade-
quate storage facilities, inefficient handling, slow postal services, 
cumbersome clearance procedures, difficulties in processing insur-
ance claims, chronic shortages of wagons, limited working hours for 
port officials and laborers. Sometimes Calcutta Customs has held up 
exports for a long time for no apparent reason or because it chal-
lenged the certificates of origin. There are many examples over 
many years of Nepalese exports being delayed for so long that the 
accumulated demurrage charges exceeded the commercial value of 
the products. This has happened recently with tumeric and pulses, 
for example. A number of times shipments of jute have been de-
stroyed or severely damaged by fire caused by spontaneous combus-
tion after being stored improperly for a long time. 
The excessive number of transshipments of goods moving by 
rail is a serious problem. The Indian Railways are still not very effi-
cient and there is serious congestion at the major transshipment 
points. Congestion is most serious at Raxaul, where problems of se-
curity, Indian goods stored at Nepal siding and irregular arrival of 
Nepal-bound goods without advance notice add to the woes of insuf-
ficient storage. Barauni, where two-thirds of Nepal's imports (eJrcept 
for pol products) are transshipped, is also not very efficient Since 
14. Nepal Overseas Trade Statistics 1977-78, pp. 148-165. 
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January 1980 some transshipment (from broad gauge to truck) of 
Nepalese imports has been effected at Narayanpur Anant yards near 
Muzaffapur, relieving some of the congestion at Barauni. Other 
problems with rail shipment include excessive customs duty insur-
ance (required policies costing several times the Indian customs duty 
in order to assure that the goods actually reach Nepal), difficulty in 
retrieving goods at customs warehouses, different working hours for 
Indian and Nepalese customs officials at border posts, etc. Within 
India there are 25 government and private agencies involved in 
Nepalese third country trade and 60 different types of documents 
comprising 240 forms in regular and special use. All of this results in 
average transit times between Nepal and Calcutta of about two 
months. 
Truck transport costs 3-4 times more than rail transport within 
India, but it would result in a net saving in time and cost to shippers, 
especially for valuable goods. India, however, restricts truck haulage 
to "sensitive" goods, bulk cargoes, and some aid goods. Even when 
permitted, truck transport is subject to many restrictions. The use of 
containers is limited, individual packages in trucks must be sealed, 
trucks are restricted to certain roads even during bad weather, some 
Indian states levy taxes on trucks in transit, and so on. Nevertheless, 
it is likely that truck transport will increase if only to reduce the 
tremendous cost of transit. It has been estimated that the direct costs 
ofland-lockedness amount to 10-15 percent ofNepal's GNP, not in-
cluding unavoidable costs due to her geographic position, but only 
the difference between exisitng and technically possible practices. 
The UNDP UNCTAD/ESCAP Project of Assistance to the 
Least Developed Land-locked Countries in Asia (RAS/72/077) has 
helped to ease some fo Nepal's transit problems in a variety of ways. 
It has made many studies and produced most useful reports on vari-
ous aspects of the transit situation and made recommendations for 
improvements. It has held seminars and workshops, prepared the 
way for development of routes and ports other than Calcutta and 
provided technical assistance in various transit operations. It has 
also helped arrange the allocation of funds from the UN Special 
Fund for Land-locked Developing Countries for the construction of 
a large warehouse in Calcutta port for Nepal's use. With all this 
help, however, Nepal must still negotiate with India about virtually 
every aspect of her transit. 
Nepal faces handicaps other than the lack of an alternate transit 
state in negotiating with India for suitable transit arrangements. 
Most important of these disadvantages is an overwhelming disparity 
34 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
in size, population, level of economic development, military 
strength, and governmental organization and experience. Add to 
that the fact that though the two countries have almost diametrically 
opposite import policies, some eighty-five percent of Nepal's total 
trade is with India, and a situation exceedingly difficult for Nepal 
becomes apparent. 
Trade and transit, however, vital as they are, constitute only a 
portion of the complex Indo-Nepal relationship. Strong and ancient 
cultural ties bind the two countries together, but different political 
and social systems give them distinct personalities. Though 
Nepalese generally resent the overpowering Indian influence in their 
country on everything from consumer goods and movies to com-
merce, much of which is controlled by Indian merchants, they still 
serve in the Indian army (as "Gurkhas"), go to India for sophisti-
cated medical treatment and higher education, invest surplus capital 
in India, and migrate to india for work. The relationship between 
the two countries is frequently described as "Love hate" or "big 
brother-little brother," but underlying it is a deep-seated Nepalese 
desire to remain independent. 
It would be difficult indeed to find another land-locked state in 
the world with as varied and serious a set of obstacles to "free unin-
terrupted, and continuous" transit to and from the sea as Nepal, and 
yet Nepal does have transit facilities in India. Relations between the 
two countries, moreover, are good at present and the transit situation 
is improving 
5. LAOS 
Of the three countries we are surveying here, Laos is poorest, 
least populated, least industrialized and most isolated. With an area 
of 236,800 sq. km., it is a relatively large country, but about two-
thirds of the country is mountain and highland terrain (averaging 1-
2,000 meters above sea level), and even in the levelland where culti-
vation is most intense, the soils are poor and crop yields are low. It 
is estimated that 63 percent of the country is covered with forests, 
but probably only 30 percent of the forests have commercial value. 
The climate is the most extreme in southeast Asia and the driest in 
Indochina. Luang Prabang, the old royal capital, receives only 53 
inches of rain per year and there is a dry season from December to 
February. There was a minor drought in 1976 and an unprece-
dented drought in 1977, followed by disastrous floods in 1978. Dur-
ing this period there were calamitous food shortages and 
international relief efforts provided over 150,000 tons of foodstuffs. 
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Even in normal years it is hard to make a living in Laos, and most of 
the people live at or near the subsistence level. 
There is not, in fact, a single Lao economy. The population of 
some 3.5 million people is predominantly rural and widely scattered 
with an average population density of only 14 per sq. km. in 1980. 
About half the population lives in the plains of the Mekong River 
and its tributaries and only15 percent live in urban areas. The larger 
towns - Vientiame (the capital), Luang Prabang, Savannakhet, 
Pakse and Khammovane - are primarily regional markets, though 
they have become administrative centers as well. The Lao People's 
Democratic Republic is composed of a number of self-contained, lo-
cal economic units, usually villages, rather than one national econ-
omy with a free flow of goods throughout. This is due in large part 
to the rudimentary internal transport system. Since 1975 transport 
has had a very high priority in government planning and by late 
1982 the road network, especially in the north, was considered ade-
quate, though still badly in need of expansion and upgrading to meet 
the needs of a growing economy. 
The most important economic activity by far is subsistence agri-
culture, chiefly wet rice cultivation in the lowlands and maize and 
dry rice in the highlands. The formal export economy, however, fea-
tures tin ore, timber, coffee and water buffalo hides. Despite its pres-
ent poverty, Laos has very large reserves of potentially exportable 
iron ore, potash and gypsum - and very likely other minerals as 
well. Again, its poor transportation system and weak infrastructure 
inhibit the exploitation of these reserves. The Mekong River would 
seem to be a natural superhighway, but in fact it is quite unsuitable 
for large-scale transport. During the dry season the water is very low 
because of frozen headwaters. At that time river transport is hazard-
ous because of falls, rapids, and shallows. During the wet season 
there are very dangerous currents, shifting channels, considerable 
floating debris, etc. Before World Warr II it took longer for a river 
boat to go from Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City) to Luang Prabang 
than to go from Saigon to Marseilles by steamship. 15 Since indepen-
dence in 1954 there have been no scheduled river boats. Instead 
Highway 13, paralleling the left bank of the Mekong, carries the 
bulk of north-south traffic and since 1956 the principal Lao route to 
the sea has been the railroad across Thailand between Nonghai and 
Bangkok. 
15. Barton, Thomas Frank. "Outlets to the Sea for Land-locked Laos," The Journal 
of Geography, Vol. 59, No.5, May 1960, pp. 206-220. 
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Laos is not a major trading country. In 1980 the total value of 
its imports was $82 million and exports $21.8 million, only 26.4 per-
cent and 7 percent respectively of her GNP. Of this trade, imports 
from third countries totaled $61.5 million and exports to third coun-
tries $17.4 million. These figures are important because, besides il-
lustrating how small the formal economy actually is, they show that 
Laos is less dependent for trade on her immediate neighbors ( espe-
cially Thailand) then either Nepal or Afghanistan, but relatively 
more dependent on transit to and from the sea. 16 
Under the French colonial regime, Indochina had common cus-
toms, monetary, transit and other arrangements. These were dis-
solved in 1954 when Cambodia, North Vietnam, South Vietnam and 
Laos became independent states. South Vietnam, however, contin-
ued to accord transit facilities in Saigon to Cambodia (now 
Kampuchea) and Laos under an unwritten understanding. The 
usual transit formalities of bonds, seals and inspection were retained, 
but no duties or transit taxes were charged other than a small fee to 
cover administrative expenses. A Convention on the Port of Saigon 
was signed in Paris on December 29, 1954 which provided special 
areas of the port for Lao and Cambodian transit goods, but appar-
ently it was never implemented. Laos also signed transit agreements 
on June 2, 1959 with South Vietnam and on October 10, 1959 with 
Cambodia, but neither of these was implemented either. It is possi-
ble that Laos negotiated these agreements merely in order to en-
hance her bargaining power with Thailand, with whom she had 
signed a transit agreement in 1955. In any case, by 1956 the bulk of 
Lao transit traffic had shifted from Saigon to Bangkok. Detailed 
Lao-Thai transit agreements were signed on July 22, 1959 and June 
1, 1978. 
A comparison of these two treaties is instructive. The pream-
bles of both are modest and conservative, making no reference either 
to the underlying reason for a transit treaty for a land-locked coun-
try, or to the numerous resolutions, principles and conventions 
adopted since the 1921 Barcelona Convention which recognize the 
need for special assistance for least-developed land-locked countries. 
Neither one specifies in sufficient detail all phases of transit trade 
operations. The 1978 treaty does not include the 1959 provision that 
the Barcelona Convention"shall be subject to the laws and regula-
16. All Lao statistics must be considered less than completely accurate; these UN 
figures are very likely more accurate than most. There is also considerable "informal" or 
''unrecorded" trade, chietly the smuggling out of rice, timber, livestock and opium, as 
well as informal re-exports of luxury goods. 
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tions in force in either country," which would seem to imply greater 
conformity to the convention in some matters. Another improve-
ment in the 1978 treaty is that it removes certain bilateral trade is-
sues from the transit provisions, notably those obligating Laos to 
take certain actions to prevent smuggling. 
The 1978 treaty, however, does not provide for simplification of 
customs formalities or harmonization of documentation; it does not 
even have a protocol or memorandum which spell out procedures 
designed to reduce costs and avoid delays of traffic in transit. Both 
treaties, moreover, are at sharp variance with current international 
forwarding and transport practices in force for land-locked and 
transit countries. Instead, they establish a very restrictive transit re-
gime in which Lao goods must be handled by Thai-designated agen-
cies while providing no guarantees for timely deliveries. Even the 
1959 provision for joint customs control of traffic in transit was 
dropped in 1978. 
Both treaties, especially that of 1978, are oriented toward Lao 
third-country imports and not toward Lao exports to third countries. 
Rather than expediting the growingly essential Lao export promo-
tion and diversification, they are inhibited by requirements concern-
ing origin, marking, valuation and sanitation. One improvement, 
however, is that the Thai government corporation Express Transport 
Organization, which has a monopoly on haulage of Lao goods 
through Thailand, may no longer set and change tarrif rates freely; 
instead this is a matter for bilateral agreement. A number of other 
provisions concerning rates and charges, transit routes and facilities 
roughly balance out so that overall the 1978 treaty does not represent 
a significant improvement in the conditions for Lao transit traffic 
through Thailand. 
Since the treaty was signed, Thai-Lao negotiations on transit 
matters have continued at least through 1978 and early 1979, primar-
ily on technical matters, none of which has resulted in notable bene-
fits for Laos. Now, in addition to imposing safeguards to prevent 
smuggling, Thailand imposes various restrictions for "security" rea-
sons. The 1978 treaty, moreover, had only a one-year duration, cre-
ating a most unstable situation for Laos. Clearly, the change of 
government in Laos in 1975 has increased Thai wariness, if not out-
right hostility, toward Laos, despite their frequent expressions of fra-
ternal (or paternal) concern. Largely because of these unfavorable 
transit arrangements through Thailand, Laos is turning more and 
more toward transit through Vietnam. 
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(a) Lao Transit Routes and Facilities 
Between attainment of independence in 1954 and the change of 
government in 1975, Laos had the use of five crossing points into 
Thailand: Houeisay to Chiang Khouang in the far north near the 
Burmese border, Thanaleng near Vientiane to Nonghai, Thakhek to 
Nakhon Phanom, Savannakhet to Mukdahan and Pakse to Phibul 
Mangsahan. While all were used for bilateral trade during this pe-
riod, some 90 percent of Lao transit trade crossed the Mekong at 
Thanaleng-Nonghai. In 1957-59, for example, according to Barton, 
10 percent of Lao transit traffic went through Pakse and Savan-
nakhet together, and various other combinations of road and river 
were little usedY In September 1957 an agreement was signed be-
tween Thailand's government company, Express Transport Organi-
zation (ETO) and the Railway Express Agency of the United States 
providing for shipment of cargoes to any destination in Thailand or 
Laos on a through bill of lading. This move alone cut delivery time 
between Bangkok and Vientiane from six months to about one week; 
combined with infrastructive improvements that made transit 
cheaper and safer, it solidified the role of this route as the dominant 
one for Laos. 
In 1976-77, friction between the new Lao Peoples Democratic 
Republic and the traditional monarchy of Thailand "resulted in 
Bangkok placing a complete ban on the export of strategic materials 
to Laos." This was followed in October 1977 by a Thai ban on pe-
troleum shipments to Laos from the Shell Oil Company in Bangkok, 
a ban which was later lifted. This illustrated to Laos the danger of 
relying too much on transit across Thailand and Laos began re-
orienting herself toward Vietnam. (Relations with Kampuchea were 
also poor, so a southern route was not feasible.) A road was planned 
between Thakhek and Danang and other routes to the east were 
considered. 18 
During this period, there was also a radical shift in the direction 
of Lao imports. In 1976 Thailand was the dominant source of im-
ports; in 1977 Laos imported far less from Thailand, and the Soviet 
Union suddenly became the major supplier. At the same time Ja-
pan's share of exports to Laos doubled while all other sources to-
17. For more details of Lao transit in the late 1950's, see Stojkovic, Ivan, "Les 
Problemes du Transport et du Transit au Laos," United Nations Department of Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs, May 1962. 
18. Hardstone, Peter C.N., "Laos: The Transportation Problems of an Indochinese 
Landlocked State," Philippine Geographical Journal, Vol. 22, No.3, July-September 1978, 
pp. 151-160. 
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gether provided less than 10 percent of Lao imports. The pattern has 
since returned to a more normal one, but this shift also illustrates the 
volatility of trading patterns due to political conditions. Inevitably, 
changing trading patterns mean changing transit patterns for a land-
locked country. A more important, long-term change in Lao imports 
since economic development really began in 1977 has been from 
predominantly pol products and luxury goods to food, industrial raw 
materials, machinery and transportation equipment. Thus there is 
greater need now for safe, efficient and economical transit. Lao ex-
ports have not changed so much, either in volume or composition, 
but export earnings are more important than ever because they are 
needed now for investment in economic development. 
The main Lao transit route remains Nonghai-Bangkok. There 
are good road and rail connections between the two termini and both 
are heavily used for Lao transit traffic. The Port of Bangkok is a 
river port and subject to a draft limitation of 8.2 meters. The port 
comrises a mix of State and privately-owned wharves with Klong 
Toi, owned and operated by the Port Authority of Thailand, forming 
its principal component. Some Lao transit traffic is landed at the 
Thai Maritime Company terminal, but Klong Toi is really Laos' 
gateway to the world. On the whole the port is efficiently run. Since 
traffic volume has grown rapidly, congestion began to be a problem 
in the late 1970s, but the port is being expanded to accomodate this 
new traffic. In addition, the Thai government is constructing a new 
deep-water port at Sattahip (due for completion in 1985) and plans 
another at Laem Chabang, 70 km. south of Bangkok, scheduled to 
go into operation in the early 1990s. In future, Laem Chabang might 
become the principal Lao transit port. 
The Port Authority of Thailand has provided Laos with a new, 
efficient intransit warehouse in Klong Toi. It would be more useful 
if it were on the water and it is now occasionally too small to accom-
modate all the goods in transit at a particular time, but the Thais 
seem willing to assist in such improvements as might be necessary. 
Thai trucks ply directly between this warehouse and the ferry at 
Nonghai, cross the Mekong on the ferry and unload their cargoes in 
the Lao port of Thanaleng, whence they are transported to their ulti-
mate destination by Lao trucks. Exports move in the reverse direc-
tion. When the railroad is used, trucks must still carry the cargoes 
between the trains and the transit warehouses in Bangkok and 
Nonghai. Generally speaking, Laos has few transit problems in 
Bangkok, except for some delays in clearance and occasional conges-
tion, and is free to choose between rail and road transport between 
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Bangkok and Nonghai. The choice depends on the type of cargo, 
availability of wagons and comparative costs. 
The real bottleneck in this transit route is the Mekong River 
crossing. At both Nonghai and Thanaleng storage facilities are in-
adequate and the concrete ramps leading down to the river are so 
steep that trucks sometimes roll or slide down them into the river. 
Cargo handling equipment is inadequate and there are no provisions 
for handling containers. For the river crossing itself, there are only 
three ferries (of 50, 50 and 70 tons capacity), three tow boats and two 
barges available. The ferries are ancient and in poor condition. 
Working conditions and efficiency are better at Nonghai than in 
Thanaleng, but are far from ideal. All of these problems of inade-
quate facilities are in the process of being remedied now, with new 
Lao trucks and ferries enroute, new warehouses planned on both 
sides of the river and other improvements planned or under way. 
This is essential, for in 1979 this crossing handled 95 percent of lLao 
imports and 55 percent of her exports. Since Thailand dosed the 
border at Mukdahan/Savannaknet in July 1980, virtually all of 
Laos' overseas trade has passed through here. 19 
The only other border crossing point between Thailand and 
Laos from 1978 to July 1980 was Mukdahan/Savannakhet. The pri-
mary transit goods using this route were Lao logs being exported and 
petroleum products coming in. Three ferries of 60, 60 and 80 tons 
capacity carry goods and there are 8 boats for passengers. All are 
owned by private Thai entrepreneurs. The ramps down to the river 
are not paved and are particularly dangerous in wet weather. There 
is no rail service, but the highways serving both towns are good. 
Cargo handling equipment, warehouses and other facilities, how-
ever, are seriously deficient even if Thailand again permits use of 
this crossing, Laos may choose not to use it. She is currently build-
ing a new transit port at Ken Kabao, 27 km. upstream from Savan-
nakhet as part of her program to reorient a large part of her transit 
traffic from Thailand to Vietnam. The plan is to use the Mekong for 
transport between Houeisay and Ken Kabao and truck transport 
over Route 9 between Ken Kabao/Savannakhet and Danang. 
The French Governor-General in 1898 conceived the idea of a 
railroad connecting Laos with the east coast, but construction did not 
begin until the 1930s. In 1937 about 11 miles of the projected U7-
19. At Nonghai there are also passenger ferries crossing the Mekong to Thadua, 
Laos, adjacent to Thanaleng. These "ferries" are little more than large canoes with in-
board engines mounted amidships and can accommodate only about a dozen people 
seated on benches around the sides. 
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mile line between Tanap and Thakhek was opened to traffic. A 25-
mile ropeway was also constructed across the Mugia pass between 
Xam Cue and Ban Naphao which operated until March 1945. Then, 
because of increasing costs in the mountains and low revenues from 
the main Hanoi-Saigon railroad, construction was halted. Before 
World War II three highways- numbers 7, 8 and 9- linked the Me-
kong with the coast, but they were never really functional and have 
since degenerated even more. 
Since relations with Thailand have worsened in recent years 
and Laos has come under very considerable Vietnamese influence, 
she is trying to revive these old routes, or develop even better ones. 
This involves two important projects: improving transportation on 
the Mekong and improving the roads through the mountains to the 
coast. The first is also a prime objective of the Mekong Commit-
tee.20 This will involve removing rocks. dredging sandbars, charting 
and marking channels, etc. This will enable the river to be used ex-
tensively for long hauls instead of solely for local traffic as at 
present.21 
In October 1979 Laos signed an agreement with Vietnam for 
port facilities at Danang and for Vietnamese transport of transit 
goods. Even before this agreement, however, some Lao goods tran-
sited Vietnam, using the ports of Haiphong and Danang. The major 
impediment to such transit is the deplorable state of the roads, espe-
cially in Laos. They can be used only in dry weather and only for 
loads of under 20 tons (in some places only two tons). Another prob-
lem is that of too much one-way traffic: most imports are bound for 
northern Laos while most exports originate in the south. At present 
the emphasis is on upgrading Highway 9 to Danang, but it is possi-
ble that in the future the principal transit route through Vietnam will 
be Highway 8 to Vinh.22 
While air transport has since 1975 become very important 
within Laos, international air transport is still rudimentary. Under a 
1978 agreement there is one flight a week in each direction between 
20. The Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin 
was established in 1957 by the four riparian States - Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and 
South Vietnam - to plan the integrated, multipurpose development of the basin with the 
air of many regional, international and national agencies. 
21. In 1980 it was estimated that only 2.8 percent of the volume of all Lao freight was 
carried by river. There were only 37 Lao river vessels, of which 32 were antiquated 
barges. These figures are likely to grow larger in coming years. 
22. Vietnam has been helping Laos upgrade Highway 9 and COMECON has under-
taken to help with Highways 7 and 9, according to Lee Yong Leng, Southeast Asia and 
the Law of the Sea, Revised Edition, Singapore University Press, 1980. 
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Bangkok and Vientiane and some service between Vientiane and 
Hanoi and Singapore. These flights carry very litte cargo. Interest-
ingly, though, Laos has since 1978 been a transit State for Vietnam. 
Seeds, medicines and other high-value aid goods come from Europe 
and Australia by plane to Bangk~k and move by truck to the Vien-
tiane airport, whence they are flown to Hanoi. It seems unlikely, 
however, that air cargo will be very important for Lao overseas trade 
for some time to come. 
(b) Lao Transit Problems 
Many of the problems faced by Laos in her transit trade have 
been discussed above. The two outstanding ones, however, remain 
to be covered, at least in sketchy form. They are the very complex 
procedures and the high costs involved in transiting Thailand. 
The first known detailed study of this situation was done in 
1971?3 It covered the transit routes between Bangkok and the five 
Lao entry points listed above, but concentrated on the most impor-
tant, the route to Nonghai. At that time, trucks carried all but goods 
that required special care or were too big and needed rail transport, 
and ETO had an official monopoly on truck transport. ETO used a 
subcontractor, Eaa Peng Chieng (EPC), for all intransit trucking and 
it also did some of the hauling between Thanaleng and Vientiane. 
Pol products, technically third country imports, were actually im-
ported from Thailand since they were refined there. They were 
shipped to Nonghai by private rail and truck transporters and thence 
by ferry to Thanaleng. The major and persistent Lao complaints 
were about delays in shipments and high freight charges by ETO. In 
addition, considerable sums of "tea money" had to be paid along the 
way to highway and local police, customs officials and others. 
These observations have been confirmed and elaborated upon 
by several United Nations experts (and by this writer) since 1971. 
One pointed out, for example, that ETO freight rates for intransit 
cargoes were higher than for domestic goods, quite to the contrary of 
established international practice. ETO claimed that its charges in-
cluded payment for such services as insurance, loading and unload-
ing, facilitating customs clearance and shipping across the Mekong, 
and guarding the shipments. In fact, however, these services are less 
than satisfactory as well as being overpriced. Some Lao importers 
23. Koosuwan, Thongchai, "Analysis of Transportation oflntransit Goods to Laos," 
Master's Thesis, Thammaset University, Bangkok, August 1971. 
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even place their own guards on ETO trucks to try to reduce the dam-
age and pilferage that plagues their transit shipments. 
Some other Lao complaints concern congestion in the Port of 
Bangkok, numerous public holidays when customs officials do not 
work, requirement for advance payments for haulage from the port, 
delays in identifying and handling bulky packages, cumbersome cus-
toms procedures, insufficient trucks in the port area, labor problems 
in the port, Thai rather than Lao control of goods in transit, customs 
inspection requiring unloading and reloading trucks at Nonghai, 
confinement to the one port of entry into Laos, the various inadequa-
cies of facilities described above, shortages of trucks for the haul 
across Thailand, and on and on. Overwhelmingly, however, the 
principal problems are the Mekong River crossing and the ETO 
monopoly.24 
The first may be solved to a large extent in the near future if the 
Nonghai-Vientiane railway-cum-highway bridge over the Mekong is 
ever built, as agreed upon by the two countries under the Mekong 
Scheme over a decade ago. The second may be more difficult to 
solve, entangled as it is with Thai politics and commercial considera-
tions. Under increasing pressure, the Thai government has recently 
asserted that Laos actually chose the ETO monopoly over two other 
alternatives, and claim that they are willing to consider joint trans-
portation development companies, as recommended many times by 
Lao officials and importers and by UN experts. 
Meanwhile, project RAS/72/077 has been operating in Laos 
since September 1979, doing the same kind of detailed, basic studies 
as in Afghanistan and Nepal. The project was designed to helping to 
train Lao nationals in transit operations and otherwise, under very 
difficult conditions of poor infrastructure, novice officials and civil 
strife, all of which hinder communications and mobility, doing what 
it can to ease the transit problems of the country. One concrete ac-
complishment was finalization of the purchase of trailer-hauling 
truck tractors with money from the UN Special Fund for Land-
locked Developing Countries. 
With all this, the fact remains that Laos has very little leverage 
in negotiating with Thailand for better transit arrangements and 
lower charges. The Thai government maintains tight control over 
24. In 1980, transit costs for imports broke down this way: port charges 22 percent, 
transshipment charges 12 percent, clearing fees 6 percent, customs charges 3 percent, and 
transportation between Bangkok and Thanaleng 57 percent. This extraordinarily high 
cost for transport appears to be due entirely to the ETO monopoly. 
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the whole process, even though one of the original reasons for it -
illegal re-export of luxury goods from Laos into Thailand and de-
flection of such goods into Thailand before they reach Laos - is no 
longer relevant. It seems to have been replaced by a new concern, 
what the Thais refer to as "security" considerations. One observer, 
noting the several closings of the border by Thailand since 1975 on 
these grounds, has commented, "It is a good illustration of a land-
locked state at an ideological boundary suffering from the enmity of 
its neighbor."25 
6. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
What does all this mean? What can we learn from a study of 
these three Asian land-locked countries and their transit problems? 
We have already examined these problems in some detail and 
reached some conclusions about them individually. Now it seems 
appropriate to see if the three cases form patterns of any kind and if 
the patterns conform to the generalizations about land-locked states 
made in the introduction. Then we shall review briefly the six ap-
proaches to resolution of the problems discussed in the introduction 
and see how relevant they are to the cases of Afghanistan, Nepal and 
Laos. Finally, we can project a bit into the future and suggest a 
reasonable picture of the transit situation in light of past patterns 
and current developments. 
In terms of physical geography, the three countries exhibit im-
portant similarities and some differences. In all three the proportion 
of levelland is small and both Afghanistan and Nepal are domi-
nated by mountain ranges among the world's most massive. Only in 
Afghanistan are there high mountains in the middle of the country. 
but rugged tarrain makes travel difficult in the others as well. All 
three countries experience wet and dry seasons; overall, Afghanistan 
is the driest, Nepal and the wettest and Laos in between. All three 
are drained by significant rivers, but in Afghanistan only the Hel-
mand may be considered large, while Nepal has a number of large 
rivers flowing into India and Laos is blessed with the mighty Me-
kong and its tributaries which someday might provide her with a 
true outlet to the sea. Laos appears to be the most highly mineral-
ized of the three, but Afghanistan has important iron ore and natural 
25. Lee Yong Leng,supra note 22, p. 47. This observation seems more relevant now 
than ever, since it was reported in late 1980 that Thailand had completely closed its 
border with Laos. No other information is available on this closure. 
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gas reserves. Forests are important resources in Nepal and Laos, but 
are rapidly disappearing because of poor management. 
Historically and culturally, the countries are quite different. 
Laos is the only one of the three to have been colonized by Europe-
ans; Afghanistan and Nepal have long been classic independent 
buffer States. All are ethnically heterogeneous, but Afghanistan is 
predominantly Muslim, Nepal Hindu and Laos Buddhist. All three 
have been strongly influenced culturally by their neighbors: Afghan-
istan by Persia, Nepal by Tibet and India, and Laos by China and 
Thailand. Nepal and Laos have had little contact with the outside 
world until recently, while Afghanistan for millenia has been a cross-
roads of Asia. 
Economically, all three are predominantly agricultural, though 
industrialization has begun modestly in Afghanistan and Nepal. All 
export chiefly commodities and import chiefly manufactured goods, 
including petroleum products. Laos has the smallest foreign trade of 
the three, though conceivably, with its great untapped mineral re-
sources, it has the greatest potential. All have very weak infrastruc-
tures, Laos weakest of all, and all are trying to improve them with 
foreign assistance. As for transit, each country has advantages not 
shared by the others: Afghanistan's truck routes to Europe, Nepal's 
multiple entry/exit points along the Indian border, and Loas' rela-
tively efficient route through Thailand. But each suffers unique lia-
bilities as well: Afghanistan's generally poor relations with her 
erstwhile principal transit State, Nepal's confinement to a single sea-
port for transit, Laos' almost total absence of third country trade by 
air. Afghanistan and Laos already act, in a modest way, as transit 
states for their neighbors, while conceivably in the future trade could 
flow between Tibet and India through Nepal. 
Politically, the three countries are quite different. Afghanistan 
and Nepal were once verymuch larger during periods of aggressive 
expansion but have lost territory partly as a result of European activ-
ity .. Afghanistan and Laos were until the 1970s traditional monar-
cl}ies and Nepal still is. Afghanistan and Laos now have communist 
governments aligned with the Soviet Union (Afghanistan under So-
viet occupation, Laos partly through Vietnam and partly directly), 
while Nepal enjoys some measure of democracy. Despite occasional 
strains, Nepal has long been on good terms with her only two neigh-
bors, while Afghanistan has good. relations only with the USSR 
among her four neighbors and Laos only with Vietnam among her 
five neighbors. While all three can offer something to their neigh-
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bors in exchange for transit rights and facilities, none is in a strong 
bargaining position. 
Summing up, we can fairly say that all three countries match 
the generalization made in the introduction about developing land-
locked countries: By world standards, all are small, poor and weak. 
All three countries have, indeed, also sought to overcome these 
handicaps, which are common to all "least developed" countries but 
greatly exacerbated by the lack of a sovereign seacoast, by each of 
the six methods described in the introduction. In the case studies we 
have emphasized four of them: bilateral negotions with transit 
States; internal development, particularly of transportation; im-
provements in transit facilities, including development of alternate 
routes; and the work of the United Nations, especially of the United 
Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development and the United Nations Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. It might be useful to 
say a bit more about the remaining two: regional integration and 
cooperation, and international law. 
Of all the world's major regions, Asia is the least organized. 
There is no region-wide intergovernmental organization comparable 
in any way to such groups as the Organization of American States, 
the Council of Europe, the Organization of African Unity or the 
South Pacific Commission. The entity closest to them is the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations, which only came to life after the 
communist takeovers in Indochina in 1975, is still not a very signifi-
cant force in the region, and has only five members, none of which is 
land-locked. There is no tradition of unity or concerted action in the 
region, no sense of common identity or destiny. There is no move-
ment whatever toward economic integration and even such regional 
cooperation as exists has been stimulated, nurtured and financed 
from outside the region, notably by ESCAP, the Asian Development 
Bank and the Colombo Plan. The Asian Highway and the Mekong 
Scheme are the only two regional projects so far, and both of them 
involve one or more of the countries we are examining here. 
Significantly, Asia is the only region in the world where transit 
states (USSR, Iran, Pakistan, India, Thailand and Vietnam) insist 
that transit is strictly a bilateral matter and refuse to consider any 
sort of regional transit system or even adhere to internationally 
adopted legal instruments or practices designed to aid the free flow 
of commerce for the benefit of all. China, which borders all five 
Asian land-locked countries, is not yet an important transit state for 
any of them and has not taken a forceful position on transit matters. 
TRANSIT PROBLEMS 47 
India and Pakistan have been the least cooperative of the transit 
states, and only Thailand has endorsed Project RAS/72/077. It is 
likely to be a long time before cooperation in transit matters reaches 
the level it has in Europe, Africa or South America. 
As for international law, we gave a summary of relevant devel-
opments in the introduction. It remains to say a little more about 
UNCLOS Ill, the roles of Afghanistan, Nepal and Laos in it, and its 
results as far as transit is concerned. First, it is fair to say that the 
land-locked states at UNCLOS III were outmaneuvered at the very 
beginning, actually even before the conference began, at a series of 
regional meetings in Africa and Latin America, and despite - or 
perhaps because of- their alliance with the so-called geographi-
cally disadvantaged states, never regained any of their losses and 
never really played a major role in the conference. This was true in 
spite of the persistent, often skillful and sometimes heroic leadership 
of a few delegates from Land-locked countries. Among them were, 
in the early years, Abdul Hakim Tabibi of Afghanistan and a little 
later Shailendra Kumar Upadhyay of Nepal. 
The full story of the role of the land-locked states at UNCLOS 
III is yet to be told, though a number of articles have dealt with 
certain aspects of it.26 Summarizing briefly, we can say that they 
threw away all of their bargaining power by accepting the notion of 
a 200-mile exclusive economic zone in the interst of "Third World 
Solidarity" before UNCLOS III opened in 1973, without obtaining a 
quid pro quo. Thereafter, all their energies were concentrated on try-
ing to get back a small part of what they had given away. In the end, 
they retained their right to sail their own ships flying their own flag, 
won theoretically equal access to and voice in the management of 
the mineral resources of the International Seabed Area along with 
coastal States, and managed to gain only greatly circumscribed ac-
cess to a tiny fraction of the living resources of the exclusive eco-
nomic zone. They retrieved no rights to the non-living resources of 
the EEZ and nothing whatever from the considerably extended con-
26. A representative sample of the more recent ones might include: Cabello Sarubbi, 
Oscar J., "La Participaci6n de los Estados sin litoral en la Tercera Conferencia de las 
Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho del Mar, "Estudios Paraguayos, Vol. 6, No.I, Septem-
ber 1978, pp. 63-84; Mirvahabi, Farin, "The Rights of the Land-locked and Geographi· 
cally Disadvantaged States in Exploitation of Marine Fisheries," Netherlands 
International Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1979, pp. 130-162; and Sinjela, A. Mpazi, 
"Freedom of Transit and the Right of Access for Land-locked States: The Evolution of 
Principle and Law," Georgia Journal of lntemational and Comparative Law, Vol. 12, No. 
1, 1982. 
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tinental shelf. As far as the transit provisions of the United Nations 
Convention of the Law of the Sea are concerned, they represent only 
a slight net gain over the 1965 New York Convention and very little 
more than the relevant provisions, broadly interpreted, of the Barce-
lona Convention and Statute of 1921. 
Very briefly, Part X of the Convention provides for a right of 
access to and from the sea and freedom (not a right) of transit for 
land-locked states reasonably satisfactory definitions of terms, em-
phasis on bilateral agreements for details of transit arrangements, a 
sweeping provision that transit states "shall have the right to take all 
measures necessary to ensure that the rights and facilities provided 
for in this part for land-locked States shall in no way infringe their 
legitimate interests" (Article 125.3), exclusion of application of the 
most-favored-nation clause, exemption of traffic in transit from 
charges other than fees for services rendered, non-discrimination in 
setting of charges and taxes for means of transport, free zones at 
ports of entry and exit, cooperation in the construction and improve-
ment of means of transport, requirement for the transit state to avoid 
delays of traffic in transit, equal treatment in maritime ports, and 
allowance for the granting of facilities greater than those provided 
for in the Convention. 
In essence the Convention simply lays out guidelines, a 
franework which must be fleshed out by bilateral, subregional and 
regional arrangements, and a datum plane or standard against which 
such arrangements can be measured. It solves no problems, lays out 
no inflexible rules, and is clearly weighted in favor of transit states. 
Nevertheless, if widely adopted and accepted as binding interna-
tional law by transit states, it can form the foundation for a very real 
improvement in the transit situation of land-locked countries in the 
decades to come. 
The land-locked countries, however, particularly those in Asia, 
cannot rely solely or even largely on international law, no matter 
how favorably interpreted and applied, to solve their geographical 
handicap of separation from the sea. This problem, after all, is fun-
damentally political and in the long run only good relations with the 
transit states can come close to solving the problem. Meanwhile -
and in addition- they will have to pursue all the other means avail-
able to them. This will not be easy, particularly in Asia, but the 
effort must be made and the rest of the world should cooperate to the 
maximum extent possible. 
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